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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes the security risks for network-centric weapon systems as a 
combination of different aspects of security, each with its own threats and mitigation 
strategies.  Computer and network security deals with cryptography, authentication, and 
attacks on software.  Information security deals with the ability of the system to process 
information of different classifications but prevent disclosure to unauthorized users.  
Physical security ranges from hardware destruction to reverse engineering of captured 
hardware.  Operational security covers the inability of covert units to transmit to the 
network without compromising their positions.  Personnel security discusses the ways 
that people can intentionally or accidentally weaken the system during development or 
operations.  
Security of network-centric weapon systems is now a System of Systems (SoS) 
engineering problem and system developers must therefore embrace a systems 
engineering approach to security and consider all the threats and vulnerabilities facing the 
system.  This examination must include not only the technical characteristics of the 
components but also the people who operate and maintain the system and the 
requirements of the mission.  Only by mitigating the most efficient attacks on the system, 
regardless of the type of attack, can developers maximize the overall security of the 
system. 
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The need for military commanders and units to communicate with each other has 
existed since antiquity.  The creation of hierarchically organized armies led commanders 
to realize that their forces fought more efficiently when concentrated against a smaller 
force.  These commanders developed tactics to flank enemy positions and deliver a 
concentrated attack.  Execution of these tactics required the commanders to maintain an 
operational picture and communicate orders to their units, who executed the orders and 
reported their situations back to the commanders.  Communication started with runners 
and flag signals, evolved into radio voice messages, grew to include written messages 
delivered by ground or satellite radio, and finally made use of tools like the U.S. Navy’s 
Link-16, which allows real-time sharing of both friendly and enemy position data.  
Network-centric weapon systems seek to provide a technological and tactical leap in the 
efficiency of such communication. 
A. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WEAPON 
SYSTEMS 
Network-centric weapon systems seek to elevate the status of the latest 
communication tools from their current position as add-on peripheral gear to a prominent 
role as a critical element of every platform.  They capitalize upon the greater 
communication capability provided by computers and allow every unit to use an 
operational display that shows the sum of friendly and hostile unit positions known 
across the entire force.  The availability of this information drives a paradigm shift where 
units are considered nodes in a network rather than stand-alone actors.  Most units serve 
as both users and providers of information, while stand-alone sensors serve as providers 
only and command centers serve as users only. 
This paradigm shift from stand-alone actor to network member has its greatest 
impact upon human behavior.  Equipped with the communications, processing, and 
interface equipment needed to provide a force-wide situational awareness display, the 
people in the system adapt their tactics, behavior, and organization to take full advantage 
 2
of their new awareness.  Commanders use a more complete picture of the action to 
provide subordinate commanders and individual units with general combat goals instead 
of specific movement orders; operational units receive these goals and decide for 
themselves how best to maneuver and strike in a rapidly changing environment.  Units 
also observe the status of both friendly and enemy forces and independently adapt their 
tactics to best collaborate with friendly forces.  This self-synchronization and 
collaboration is one of the goals of network-centric warfare (Office of Force 
Transformation 2005). 
Another goal of network-centric warfare is to make the command process faster 
and more robust.  The powerful communications tools inherent in a network-centric 
system allow commanders to rapidly send situation updates, goals, and orders to the 
fighting forces.  Provided with a complete operational picture and the set of combat 
goals, subordinate commanders gain the ability to immediately and seamlessly assume 
command duties when the original commander is disabled.  The automatic sharing of 
information eliminates the need for lengthy turnover processes between the departing and 
relieving commanders and greatly reduces the chance that information could be dropped 
during the transition (Office of Force Transformation 2005). 
Overall, network-centric systems seek to lift the “fog of war” and provide more 
efficient use of forces.  When every ship, plane, vehicle, and infantry or special forces 
group knows the complete picture (the location and tasking of all friendly forces, the 
estimated position and strength of enemy forces, and the set of combat goals and progress 
made toward them), well-trained forces can apply themselves to maximize overall 
combat effectiveness.  Implemented properly, the use of network-centric systems 
promises greater combat power provided by a smaller force with fewer friendly losses. 
Such a comprehensive system faces serious implementation issues.  Shifting to 
network-centric warfare requires a change not only in hardware and software but also in 
doctrine, organization, training, and logistics.  Such a dramatic shift requires time, 
probably several years at least, to accomplish.  The problem, then, is how to conduct 
operations during the transition period.  How will the network-centric units coordinate 
their movements with units not yet converted?  How will commanders lead their forces 
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when the network-centric portion expects to receive goals and information while the 
legacy platform-centric portion still requires specific movement orders and manual 
relaying of situational awareness information?  The entire premise of network-centric 
warfare fails when major parts of the force are not connected to the network, so the 
upgraded units will likely be forced to operate as legacy units until the entire force is 
converted. 
Even after the total conversion of U.S. forces, allied and coalition partners will 
remain outside the network, greatly complicating multi-national operations.  Other 
nations will likely have an incompatible network architecture, if they have one at all, so 
U.S. forces will again have to revert back to legacy practices.  Given that the transition to 
network-centric warfare includes sweeping changes in doctrine, operations, and training, 
this devolution back to legacy-style operations would force U.S. units to fight in an 
unfamiliar manner and without the benefit of their training, ensuring lower efficiency and 
greater friendly losses. 
B. SECURITY RISKS 
In addition to the logistical and operational challenges of transitioning to network-
centric warfare, network-centric weapon systems also carry major security risks.  The 
shift to a network paradigm, where each unit relies upon a valid connection to a 
functional network, means that a successful attack upon the network itself can degrade 
the entire force.  These attacks can threaten any of the three critical features of an 
information system: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Harris 2008, 59–61). 
Attacks on the information system feature of confidentiality threaten to expose the 
entire friendly order of battle, tactical plans and goals, and knowledge of the opposing 
force.  The last item provides perhaps the greatest benefit to the enemy because he now 
knows which of his units remain undetected and available for a surprise assault.  An 
enemy equipped with this information has a powerful tactical advantage that can provide 
much greater effectiveness for his forces, which are now able to attack the most 
vulnerable parts of the other force while avoiding detection and prosecution of their own 
units. 
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Attacks on the information system feature of integrity threaten to sow chaos into 
the friendly force, even if few modifications actually get made to its database of 
information on unit positions, mission status, and sensor data..  The mere perception of 
tampering would destroy confidence in all network-provided information, causing 
hesitation in tactical movement and a flood of communications seeking to confirm 
position reports and identity.  This apprehension among the friendly force would 
eliminate the very benefits of networked systems, self-synchronization and a fast and 
robust command element, and leave paralyzed units vulnerable to hostile maneuver.  
Even worse is the case of undetected tampering, where the enemy can trick friendly 
forces into firing on themselves while chasing false contacts and operating blind to real 
threats. 
Attacks on the information system feature of availability represent the risk with 
the least severity but greatest likelihood.  A friendly force trained and organized to 
operate as a cohesive whole could suffer major problems if suddenly deprived of the 
network and forced to operate independently.  Enemy attacks can disrupt individual unit 
connections to the network or degrade the entire network itself using a wide array of 
computer, physical, and electromagnetic tools.  Friendly forces could slide into hesitation 
and paralysis if suddenly forced to operate independently, providing an assertive enemy 
the opportunity to bypass friendly defenses and strike at their most important targets. 
Protecting the security of network-centric weapon systems requires consideration 
of several interrelated aspects: computer and network security, information security, 
physical security, operational security, and personnel security.  Attackers have at their 
disposal a broad array of techniques to disrupt the network, so developers, maintainers, 
and users must take a systems engineering approach to the problem of defending the 
network.  This systems engineering approach considers all the vulnerabilities and the 
possible attack vectors that could exploit them in the context of the system’s operational 
environment.  It then considers the relative efficiency of these attacks and applies 
defensive resources to protect the most important and vulnerable parts of the network.  
Given the limits of funding and time during development, developers must use this 
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systems engineering approach to counter the most efficient attacks.  The efficiency of an 
attack includes its ease of execution, the number of attack opportunities, and the amount 
of damage it can deliver. 
System developers have two primary tools to ensure the security of the network.  
First, the hardware, software, and operating procedures must be developed with security 
as a primary requirement.  Designing the network to meet functionality goals and then 
later trying to build in security, a common approach in the commercial world, is likely to 
leave serious vulnerabilities behind (Schneier 2000, 395).  Flaws will remain because it is 
impossible to envision all possible attack techniques and mitigate them and because some 
security attacks rely on weaknesses in the system architecture itself.  The design must 
include defense-in-depth features that minimize single points of failure.  For example, a 
network could encrypt its communications and require authentication before accepting 
any messages, so an attacker who manages to crack the encryption scheme and send 
messages on the network would also have to figure out a way to impersonate a legitimate 
network user and spoof the authentication process.  Second, each network component and 
the overall system itself must be subjected to rigorous testing and certification.  This 
testing includes analysis of the software structure and coding, hardware examination, and 
a wide range of scenarios that target the users, interfaces, and other aspects of the system.  
Testing alone cannot guarantee the security of any complex system, but it can at least 
harden the system against the easiest and most damaging attacks (Schneier 2000). 
The need to include security in the design phase of the system extends to the 
entire system and should not be limited to the hardware and software design.  Network-
centric weapon systems are systems-of-systems (SoS), so the security architecture must 
extend to each individual member system and to the interface to the overall SoS.  Using a 
rigorous systems engineering approach for SoS will consider all the threats and 
vulnerabilities and reduce the risk that the entire system could be easily defeated through 
a previously un-considered attack on some peripheral part of the system (Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 2008).  This effort 
must include not only the technical characteristics of the components but also the people 
who operate and maintain the system, the support elements that keep the system running, 
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and the environment in which the system will operate.  Once designed, the tactics, 
doctrine, logistics, and personnel elements of the system must continue the systems 
engineering approach and consider security from the larger system perspective. 
The systems engineering approach must also extend beyond the design phase into 
the entire system life-cycle.  The earliest evaluation of technologies and doctrine must 
include the need for an inherently secure foundation (Higginbotham et al. 1998).  For 
example, the Internet and its supporting protocols were designed for an environment 
where all users were inherently trusted, so use of these protocols may inflict military 
systems with the same security problems now faced by commercial and industry users 
(Harris 2008, 19–20).  During the operation and support phase of the system, developers 
and commanders must consider the security risks that can come from operators, 
maintainers, and administrators and the consequences of deviating from security rules.  
This thesis will guide those developers and commanders, as well as operators and other 
stakeholders, in the acquisition and design of secure network-centric weapon systems. 
This thesis makes a distinction between the computerized systems comprising a 
network-centric weapon system and the computer networks already in widespread use for 
office automation, collaboration, and communication.  Most scholarship on computer 
security focuses on the latter type of system.  These systems—the ones using x86-based 
processors from Intel or AMD, Windows or Unix-based operating systems, and TCP/IP 
connections to the global internet—form the foundation for commerce, education, and 
entertainment (Comer 1999).  They experience regular security attacks from people 
seeking to commit fraud, steal proprietary information, or knock a website out of service 
(Schneier 2000, 1–5).  Their components, being designed for widespread and general-
purpose use, are inherently open to anonymous members of the public and must be 
hardened to prevent unauthorized access or malicious operations.  Service-oriented 
architectures used for military purposes fall into this category and, although they share 
many of the security risks with network-centric weapon systems, they inherit the 
additional concerns faced by commercial networks. 
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Network-centric weapon systems, the focus of this thesis, may evolve from a 
collection of special-purpose hardware and software, such as the LINK-16 tactical data 
link, that inherently rejects unauthorized access and malicious operations (Camana 2009).  
Its operators will be trained in proper and secure operation and will be accountable 
members of the military.  Even though the stakes may be higher with a weapon system 
than an office network, the developers may find it easier to secure the weapon system 
because of its limited scope and rigorous configuration management.  Many of the same 
security principles still apply, however, and much of the work done to secure office 
systems can inform the development of weapon systems’ security.  These commercial 
practices become especially relevant if the network-centric weapon systems are 
constructed from the same commercial hardware and software components as the office 
networks, which may be necessary in order to keep the cost down and the schedule short 
enough to be deployable (Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and 
Applications 2000, 176). 
C. EXAMPLE SYSTEMS 
Network-centric weapon systems recently in development include the U.S. 
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) and the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC).  Both systems illustrate the emergence of a new class of networked 
system.  This new class is a hybrid of the office automation network and the data-linked 
combat system, and it requires a consideration of security principles tailored to its 
combined lineage.  Developers must avoid both the blunt misapplication of inappropriate 
office-network security controls and the assumption that the system has no security risks 
due to its combat system characteristics. 
The FCS as originally envisioned in Figure 1, combined ground vehicles, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and remote ground sensors into a single network.  
This network was to provide mission planning, situational awareness, and tactical 
coordination to operators and commanders.  The vehicles included tanks, personnel 
carriers, mortars, cannons, command units, medical platforms, and unmanned units 
optimized for attack, reconnaissance, and logistics.  Four types of UAVs and two types of 
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unattended ground sensors were to provide sensor data without risking harm to personnel 
(Globalsecurity.org).  Due to cost and schedule problems, the Army has significantly 
revised and reduced the scope of the FCS program; however, some elements may yet 
emerge as deployable systems.  Future weapon systems will probably inherit the 
network-centric philosophy of FCS, so the original program serves as a useful example of 
a generic network-centric weapon system of the future.  This shift toward a network-
centric weapon system will likely continue even with the shift in emphasis to counter-
insurgency operations.  Army Colonel John Buckley, a strategic planner for the 
Headquarters of the Department of the Army, said, “Indeed, there is a strikingly high 
correlation between the types of capabilities that commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
requesting and the types of capabilities that are being developed through FCS” (Osborne 
2009). 
 
Figure 1.   Future Combat Systems components (From Defense Industry Daily 2008) 
The CEC provides a smaller example of a network-centric weapon system.  CEC 
gives ships, planes, and air defense units the ability to share their radar sensor 
information and create a single, fused radar air track for each target.  This sharing and 
fusing of sensor data allows all units to observe and react to any air target spotted by any 
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friendly unit that is connected to the network.  It also improves track accuracy by giving 
increased weight to the data reported from more accurate radars (O’Neil 2007, 14).  
These functions of CEC are shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4.  This application of network-
centric philosophy provides only the situational awareness function for air contacts and 
includes no functions for status-sharing or command functions; however, it does provide 




Figure 2.   CEC composite tracking and identification  













Figure 3.   CEC precision cueing (From Johns Hopkins APL 1995, 379) 
 
 
Figure 4.   CEC coordinated cooperative engagements  
(From Johns Hopkins APL 1995, 379) 
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The enormous cost and scope of the Army’s FCS illustrate the complexity of 
network-centric weapon systems and the difficulty of implementing them properly.  
Security is costly, and as Department of Defense (DoD) policy urges developers to 
pursue the “good enough” solution and to save money by stopping short of the perfect 
solution (Dudney 2009, 2), developers risk catastrophic failure of the fielded systems if 
they avoid the rigorous design and analysis needed to provide that security. 
D. OTHER STUDIES ON THIS TOPIC 
Network-centric weapons systems are System of Systems (SoS) that require a 
systems engineering approach to their security considerations. Therefore, few studies 
exist on security as specifically applied to network-centric weapon systems.  Discussions 
on computer system security for home, commercial, and industrial, and non-tactical 
military purposes dominate the literature.  Many of the principles of these works on 
commercial-type security do apply to weapon systems, particularly those built from 
commercial hardware, software, and protocols, but tactical use brings some unique 
security risks that this thesis will enumerate.  Three studies of note include a 2004 report 
titled “Issues and Requirements for Cybersecurity in Network-centric Warfare” by Drs. 
Stytz and Banks of the Air Force Research Laboratory; a book published in 2000 by the 
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications titled Network-Centric 
Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities; and a study 
underway by the Naval Studies Board titled “Information Assurance for Network-Centric 
Naval Forces.” 
The Air Force Research Laboratory report focused on computer and network 
security, describing both as attacks on software.  The report provided technical details on 
these software attacks but did not consider the other sources of security risks covered in 
this thesis.  The authors describe their vision as follows: 
Our vision for network centric warfare cyber security can briefly be 
described as calling for a seamless web of protection technologies for all 
levels and all portions of the network and software. The protection 
capabilities (and needs) range from data to network to software with all 
components being imbued with inherent capabilities to verify their own  
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correct and secure operation as well as the correct and  secure operation of 
the other interacting components of the cyber battlespace. (Stytz and 
Banks 2004, 4) 
The book from the Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and 
Applications (part of the National Research Council) provides a detailed and 
comprehensive examination of the entire field of network-centric warfare.  The chapter 
on Information Assurance includes such non-traditional risks as the espionage and 
sabotage threat during development, the vulnerabilities inherited from commercial 
hardware and software, and the danger of enemy eavesdropping and spoofing using 
captured hardware.  The book embraces the systems approach to implementation, 
operations, and security, and provides an excellent companion to this thesis despite its 
focus on the Navy and Marine Corps.  This thesis provides more of a systems engineering 
perspective as well as consideration of aspects such as operations security not covered in 
the book. 
The Naval Studies Board project commenced in January 2008 and was planned to 
be a twelve-month study.  The project’s goals include an analysis of studies on 
information assurance, an evaluation of the acquisition process with respect to 
information assurance, an assessment of security vulnerabilities, and development of best 
practices.  The project duration was extended to June 30, 2009; however, as of this 
writing, no reports have yet been released and the website for the National Academies 
still lists it as a current project.  These reports are likely to provide useful information on 
the topic, though it is not evident whether the Board will have taken the systems approach 
or will have focused on technical aspects only. 
E. PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis will evaluate the most important security risks and requirements in the 
design of network-centric systems and services.  To accomplish this, it will describe the 
difference between network-centric and stand-alone systems and consider how security 
for a network-centric system differs from commercial computer security.  It will 
summarize the attack methods of concern, describe how these attacks can gain access to 
 
 13
systems, and explain the consequences of successful attacks.  It will recommend features 
and practices to reduce the security risk and discuss the DoD requirements for testing and 
certification that enforce the use of security features. 
This examination of security considerations for network-centric weapon systems 
will help guide the acquisition process for network-centric and Service Oriented 
Architecture systems.  It will evaluate the current DoD security directives and their 
applicability to network-centric weapon systems.  It will also provide source material for 
use in the development of Naval Postgraduate School resident and certificate courses on 
network-centric system development. 
In this thesis, the following Chapters II–VI describe the various aspects of 
security most likely to factor into the design of network-centric weapon systems: 
computer and network security, information security, physical security, operational 
security, and personnel security.  Chapter VII provides information on combining these 
disparate elements into an optimized system solution that provides the greatest security 
for the lowest cost.  Chapter VIII provides an overall conclusion. 
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II. COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY 
This chapter on computer and network security deals with technological attacks 
against the execution of code and the transmission and storage of data.  Since network-
centric systems will be highly computerized, this part of system security captures the 
greatest share of attention and resources both by industry, as suggested by the 
preponderance of literature on the subject, and by this thesis.  It also presents the greatest 
engineering challenge since the problems and solutions focus on technical aspects of 
system operation rather than the operational and procedural aspects dealt with in other 
parts of system security. 
The fundamental security challenge at the heart of any computerized system is 
one of abstraction.  Levels of abstraction include the network level, component level, and 
others depending upon the specific design.  Computers do exactly as commanded by their 
programming and processor design, but users have almost no insight about the actual 
operations taking place within the microprocessors, memory chips, and other hardware.  
Users typically only see the user interface, which represents only a vague abstraction of 
the billions of operations per second acting upon the billions of bytes of data and 
instructions in a typical computer.  As noted security expert Bruce Schneier stated, 
People don’t understand computers.  Computers are magical boxes that do 
things.  People believe what computers tell them.  People just want to get 
their jobs done. (Schneier 2000, 255) 
The security risk here is that the user interface reports only what it is commanded to 
report by the underlying application, not the actual series of events.  Computers can lie 
just as easily as they can tell the truth, and users have few ways to find the lies. 
Attackers capitalize upon the enormous complexity of computer operations that 
requires such a profound abstraction in order to communicate with users.  Simple 
programs in simple systems have few opportunities for attackers to interfere with this 
trusted user-computer relationship; unfortunately, any system that meets the extensive 
requirements of a network-centric military force would be complex and therefore 
vulnerable.  System designers can establish a security architecture that reduces 
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complexity by defining discrete process and data elements and their interfaces, reducing 
the number of entry points for an attack.  Such a design follows the software engineering 
principles of loose coupling and high cohesion (Larman 2006). 
Attacks on the computer network can threaten that system’s confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability.  Confidentiality attacks involve reading secret information by 
intercepting network communications or by implanting code that grabs secret data and 
leaks it to the enemy.  Integrity attacks involve the injection of false information into a 
trusted network link or the direct alteration of data stored within the system.  Availability 
attacks involve the interruption of the system’s operations or its ability to communicate.  
Some attack techniques combine these three elements and can be used to produce a wide 
variety of effects and extensive damage (Committee on National Security Systems 2006). 
A. ATTACKS ON THE NETWORK 
Outsiders wishing to attack a network-centric system generally start by attacking 
the communications between network nodes.  The simplest type of network attack, 
jamming, relies upon the fact that a tactical military network would use electromagnetic 
transmissions to send most of its information.  Jamming has been practiced for decades, 
and it simply involves the radiation of electromagnetic noise on the same carrier 
frequency in use for communication.  Sophisticated, modern jammers can silently listen 
for transmissions and quickly send bursts of energy at a matching frequency, cutting off 
whatever message the target system intended.  Jamming intends to disrupt the availability 
of the system by making it impossible for network nodes to communicate with each 
other. 
Anti-jam techniques have also evolved over the years, and they often involve 
spread-spectrum transmissions with error detection and correction (Anderson 2008, 567–
72).  Spread-spectrum transmissions involve rapid changes in the carrier frequency (about 
77 thousand times per second in the case of Link-16), forcing the attacker to spread the 
jamming energy over a broad range of frequencies and therefore reducing the jamming 
effect on any given frequency (Carmana 2009, 1-AM-62).  The frequency selection for 
the next hop relies upon some secret data shared among the network nodes, denying the 
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enemy the ability to predict the next frequency.  Interleaving, the re-arranging of data bits 
within a message, can be used with error detection and correction algorithms such as 
Hamming codes or Reed-Solomon codes to provide redundancy in the data stream that 
allows the receiver to reconstruct a message containing a small number of missing or 
flipped bits (Carmana 2009, 2-AM-80).  In addition, several adaptive filtering techniques, 
such as notch filtering, adaptive beamforming, nonlinear adaptive filters, etc. have been 
developed for anti-jam applications (Haykin 2002). 
Outsiders can also attack the confidentiality of the target system by eavesdropping 
on network communications.  Assuming no security, electromagnetic transmissions can 
be received by friend and foe alike, so attackers need only to have a receiver tuned to the 
correct frequency and placed in the same geographic area.  The needed size and design of 
this receiver and the proximity to the transmitter depend upon the transmission frequency 
and power as well as terrain characteristics.  Landline communications can be observed 
through the use of a cable tap.  These taps can physically penetrate the cable, for 
electrical or optical cables, or can measure electromagnetic induction for electrical cables 
only (Anderson 2008, 530).  Protecting against eavesdropping, therefore, cannot rely 
upon denying the enemy the ability to receive and copy transmissions. 
Protection against eavesdropping must use encryption to disguise the true content 
of friendly transmissions.  Encryption has been in use for thousands of years and has 
exploded in complexity since the appearance of the computer, but the two fundamental 
elements have remained the same: the key and the algorithm.  The key is simply a string 
of data shared in secret among the network nodes.  The algorithm, or cipher, is the set of 
procedures for altering the message, or plaintext, and turning it into ciphertext that can 
only be decoded by someone who also possesses the same key and algorithm (Harris 
2008, 666). 
Keys come in two forms, symmetric and asymmetric.  Symmetric keys, together 
with an appropriate cipher, perform both encryption and decryption.  They operate simply 
and quickly but require the secure distribution of keys in advance.  They also require 
separate keys for every needed combination of participants since anyone with the key can 
read the conversation.  Asymmetric keys exist as matched pairs of keys, with one key 
 18
performing encryption and the other key of the pair performing decryption.  Users keep 
one key private and publish the other one for other network members to use.  Asymmetric 
encryption is much slower and more complex, but it requires no advance key distribution 
and requires only one key pair for each node (Harris 2008, 679–83). 
Ciphers use a combination of substitution, transposition, and other mathematical 
manipulation to achieve the desired degree of confusion and diffusion in the ciphertext.  
Substitution involves replacing one character for another and is popular in one-time-pad 
ciphers, where the key is the same length as the message and messages are often encoded 
and decoded by hand.  Transposition involves shuffling the order of the characters, 
similar to a word-scramble puzzle (Harris 2008, 679).  Confusion refers to making the 
relationship between the key and the ciphertext as complex as possible, and diffusion 
refers to making the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext as complex as 
possible.  Together, they ensure that small changes to the key or plaintext result in large 
changes to the ciphertext, making it difficult for an attacker to crack the code (Shannon, 
1946, 708–709). 
Computer-based ciphers tend to operate at the bit level instead of the character 
level of ancient ciphers, so more complex mathematical operations become available.  
Many ciphers use the “exclusive or” as a fast and reversible way to encrypt a data string 
according to the key.  Complex ciphers borrow the concepts of substitution and 
transposition by applying them to blocks of data and then sometimes chaining these 
blocks together and using the ciphertext from one block to form a new key for the next 
block (Harris 2008, 685–7).  Ciphers for asymmetric keys can rely upon such irreversible 
operations as modular arithmetic (taking the remainder of a division operation) to ensure 
that an enemy cannot decrypt the ciphertext using the public half of the key pair (i.e., the 
key used for encryption) (Anderson 2008, 171). 
The challenge for the attacker and an encrypted message becomes the decryption 
of an intercepted message.  The attacker needs the same resources needed by the 
legitimate recipient: the key and the cipher.  Users always keep their keys secret, and they 
often change them on a regular basis to limit the damage in case a particular key gets 
compromised.  Keys can be stored in the memory of the computer, on a storage device 
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such as a floppy disc or USB drive, or on an external processor such as a smart card.  
Smart cards such as the military Common Access Card have the advantage that they 
never transmit the key onto the computer being used for communication, where an 
attacker who gained access to the memory or file system could steal it.  Rather, they 
receive the plaintext from the computer, perform the encryption on the smart card’s 
processor, and send the ciphertext back to the computer for transmission.  Smart cards 
lack the standard file system of a general-purpose computer, making it much more 
difficult for an attacker to copy the key from the card’s memory (Harris 2008, 191). 
While keys are always kept secret, the cipher may not.  The security community 
has two distinct schools of thought regarding the secrecy of ciphers and computer code in 
general.  One side supports open-source, or public release, because scrutiny by the world 
community can reveal flaws that escaped the attention of the designers.  Ciphers are 
difficult to keep secret, and their compromise may allow adversaries to discover new 
flaws and execute attacks.  The other side supports secrecy of ciphers because an attacker 
must know the cipher in order to perform a cryptologic attack.  Even a weak and flawed 
cipher can provide adequate protection if the adversaries do not understand how it works 
(Harris 2008, 668). 
The decision on whether to release ciphers or make them secret depends in part 
upon which of the following scenarios seems more likely.  On one hand, an adversary 
might examine a public cipher and find a flaw that system designers and the worldwide 
cryptographic community all overlooked.  On the other hand, an adversary might steal a 
secret cipher and discover a vulnerability that system designers failed to catch.  This 
decision depends in part upon the development methods used for the cipher.  Ciphers 
produced by a contractor, even one operating in a classified environment, may fall victim 
to the widespread threat of industrial espionage.  Ciphers produced completely within the 
National Security Agency, on the other hand, may better resist the industrial espionage 
threat. 
Other security risks against secret ciphers can also influence the public/secret 
decision.  Secret ciphers may be discoverable by reverse-engineering attacks upon 
hardware that has fallen into enemy control.  Once compromised, a cipher (unlike the 
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encryption key) cannot easily be changed; it may take several years to develop a suitable 
replacement.  Finally, an adversary that discovers the cipher may share it with any 
number of parties hostile to the United States.  Secrecy of ciphers, and of code in general, 
may help to confound an attack, but the overall security of the system and its messages 
must not rely primarily upon that secrecy.  This idea was first proposed in 1883 by 
Auguste Kerckhoffs, who said that the only secrecy should be in the key and that the 
algorithm should be publicly known (Harris, 2008, 668). 
Even a mathematically perfect cipher may fail to protect the confidentiality of a 
message if an attacker can exploit a vulnerability in the way the cipher is implemented in 
hardware or software.  In the early 1960s, the National Security Agency discovered that 
attackers could read encrypted messages by measuring the electromagnetic emanations 
coming from communications hardware.  Code-named “Tempest,” this program also led 
to the realization that emanations depended on the combination of components and how 
they were connected—a far more complex challenge than studying individual 
components in isolation (Boak 1973, 98).  Attackers can also use timing analysis or 
power analysis to figure out the cryptographic key and other protected information by 
carefully measuring the time or electric current used by the computer performing the 
encryption/decryption (Anderson 2008, 533). 
A perfectly designed and implemented cipher may protect the contents of network 
messages, but adversaries may still deduce some important information by conducting 
traffic analysis.  Traffic analysis is the study of the identity of the sender and receivers of 
messages as well as the timing and number of messages being sent.  For example, a spike 
in traffic from a particular unit may imply that it has located enemy units or is starting an 
attack.  Friendly forces can defeat traffic analysis by sending decoy traffic to disguise 
patterns in genuine messages (Harris 2008, 1087). 
Network-based attacks on integrity extend the techniques used when 
compromising confidentiality.  Where an attack on confidentiality copies a message and 
decodes it to learn its secrets, attacks on integrity seek to use the target’s network to 
inject messages with false information.  This false information could be used to hide the 
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attacker’s forces, create diversions, or even cause fratricide by tricking the opposing force 
to fire on itself.  The adversary must understand the target’s communications 
infrastructure, protocols, ciphers, and encryption keys in both situations. 
Attackers use a wide variety of approaches to inject false information.  At the 
simplest level, the attacker mimics a legitimate network node and sends properly-
formatted but false data.  This impersonation attack can create false target data, orders, or 
status reports.  More complex attacks use session hijacking or “man-in-the-middle” 
techniques to exploit a legitimate communication session between two network nodes.  
Session hijacking requires the attacker to observe a session in progress and then conduct 
an impersonation-type attack by mimicking one of the participants, assuming its identity 
in the conversation.  If the node whose identity is being hijacked can be silenced, the 
attacker can continue the session while masquerading as that node.  Man-in-the-middle 
attacks work only when the two network nodes under attack cannot directly communicate 
with each other, as is the case over a wired connection where the wires pass through a 
node under enemy control.  In this case, the enemy hijacks the session in both directions, 
capturing all traffic and making changes as desired (Harris 2008, 1084–6). 
Authentication tools can foil attacks on integrity by forcing network nodes to 
prove their identity before participating in a communications session.  These tools 
typically use the cryptographic key as a “shared secret,” where possession of the key 
proves the person’s identity.  Both symmetric and asymmetric keys can serve this 
function, with the same logistical considerations as when they are used to protect 
confidentiality.  In the case of asymmetric encryption, the message sender uses his own 
private key to encrypt some portion of the message.  Properly decrypting that portion 
with the sender’s public key verifies the message sender’s identity because only the 
sender possesses the private key needed for encryption (Harris 2008, 682). 
Message integrity tools can also foil attacks on integrity by making it impossible 
for the attacker to alter the message content without those changes being detected.  This 
task generally employs a cryptographic hash function, which uses a complex algorithm to 
distill any size document down to a hash value.  These hash values are typically on the 
order of 128 bits long, and they are sent with the message to prove that the message has 
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not been altered.  Well-designed hash functions cause the hash value to change 
dramatically at the slightest change of the original file, and a large hash value makes it 
infeasible for the attacker to find some modification that would produce exactly the same 
hash value (Harris 2008, 714). 
To check message integrity, the message recipient simply runs the hash function 
on the received message and compares this generated hash value with the hash value sent 
with the message.  A match proves that the message has not been altered.  Of course, a 
wily attacker could simply change the message, generate a new hash value, and send the 
new hash value along with the altered message; however, encrypting the hash value 
prevents that from happening since the attacker cannot properly encrypt the bogus hash.  
In addition to protecting a message from undetected changes, an encrypted hash value 
links the message to its sender and therefore serves as a digital “signature” used for 
authentication of the sender (Harris 2008, 714–7). 
Hash functions go beyond simple error detection and correction techniques like 
cyclic redundancy checks, checksums, or Hamming codes.  These techniques protect 
messages from accidental modification during transit caused by electromagnetic 
interference or processing errors, but an attacker could easily create checksum values that 
match his altered message.  Network nodes must not rely on error detection and 
correction techniques to protect messages from malicious modification. 
A public key infrastructure (PKI) formalizes the process of sharing and validating 
public and private keys so that message recipients can trust that messages report their true 
originators and contain unaltered content.  Under a PKI, each user has a digital certificate 
issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA).  These certificates contain the user’s 
identity, his public key, the CA signature, and other protocol information.  The CA 
signature consists of a hash of the certificate data encrypted by the CA’s private key, and 
it proves that the certificate is legitimate.  So long as all participants trust the CA, any 
certificate signed by that CA can be trusted and used to validate the digital signatures of 
received messages.  Larger PKIs may have multiple layers of CAs to issue large numbers 
of certificates, but each subordinate CA in this situation has its own certificate signed by 
the one inherently trusted “root” CA (Harris 2008, 725–32). 
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Commercial computer networks, including home users accessing merchant 
websites on the Internet, use a PKI to establish encrypted connections and verify the 
identity of participants.  This commercial application of PKI has a significant weakness 
because compromised certificates can still appear to be valid.  The original intent for 
PKIs was to keep certificate revocation lists (CRLs) that list any digital certificates that 
should no longer be trusted.  As the Internet grew, however, CRLs grew too cumbersome 
to update and check (Harris 2008, 728–9).  Military networks have an advantage 
compared to the Internet because the closed and limited nature of military networks 
permits an effective use of CRLs and a more reliable defense against compromised 
certificates. 
The final type of attack upon integrity involves recording a legitimate 
communication session and replaying it later.  Since the recorded information contains all 
the correct cryptographic keys, formats, and hash values, it would appear to the receiver 
to be a legitimate message from the original sender.  The attacker likely would not even 
know the contents of the message he captured, but injecting “stale” information could 
cause confusion for the receiver.  Network nodes, therefore, need some method to ensure 
that replayed messages are rejected. 
A combination of time stamps and nonces guarantee the originality of friendly 
messages and defeat the replay attack.  A time stamp shows the age of the original 
message, and receivers can automatically reject messages older than a chosen age.  The 
nonce, which is simply a randomly selected number, proves the uniqueness of each 
legitimate message.  When all network nodes agree on a certain age threshold beyond 
which they will reject incoming messages, then they simply need to read the nonce of 
each message they receive and compare it to a list of received nonces within the age 
threshold.  Since each legitimate message will have a unique nonce, any message that 
carries the same nonce is rejected as a replay (Anderson 2008, 66–7; Harris 2008, 756).  
This assumes that the attacker cannot decrypt the message, replace the nonce with a new 
value, and re-encrypt it; however, any attacker with the ability to perform those steps 
could launch much more damaging attacks than a simple replay. 
 24
B. ATTACKS ON THE COMPUTER 
Once an attacker gains access to a computer within a network, a vast array of 
attacks become possible.  Where a network attacker operates as an outsider interfering 
with message flow and possibly reading secret messages and injecting false information, 
a computer attacker assumes the much more dangerous position of an insider capable of 
altering both data and programming code.  Any attack technique can potentially interfere 
with availability, confidentiality, and integrity in any combination. 
Gaining direct access to one of the computers within the network can be achieved 
through network or physical access.  Network-based access starts with one of the 
integrity-based network attacks discussed above and involves the attacker injecting some 
sequence of commands that exploits a remote-access feature of that host (Anderson 2008, 
636).  These remote-access features may give network administrators the ability to 
control or configure network nodes from a central location or to update computer code 
following the discovery of a security vulnerability or some other kind of bug.  Physical 
access involves actual possession of the target computer and manipulation of memory, 
cache, or processor registers to install malicious code or false data.  Further information 
about physical access will be presented in Chapter IV. 
The number of vulnerabilities available on a computerized system depends largely 
upon how much of the system uses general-purpose hardware and software.  In order to 
save money, develop systems faster, and take advantage of the latest technology offered 
by industry, program managers frequently use commercial hardware and software as the 
foundation of their developing systems.  Developers take these general-purpose 
processors and software and program them to perform the functions needed by the new 
system.  Unfortunately, these items retain the inherent ability to perform any function if 
so programmed, so attackers can potentially alter a device’s programming to change its 
behavior.  Adding to this vulnerability is the fact that many commercial applications are 
not designed with rigorous security as a top requirement and therefore can contain 
vulnerabilities that ease an attacker’s access to the code.  Commenting on the general 
lack of security in commercial software products, Bruce Schneier wrote, 
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The costs of adding good security to software products are essentially the 
same ones incurred in increasing network security—large expenses, 
reduced functionality, delayed product releases, annoyed users—while the 
costs of ignoring security are minor: occasional bad press, and maybe 
some users switching to competitors' products.  The financial losses to 
industry worldwide due to vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows 
operating system are not borne by Microsoft, so Microsoft doesn't have 
the financial incentive to fix them.  If the CEO of a major software 
company told his board of directors that he would be cutting the 
company's earnings per share by a third because he was going to really—
no more pretending—take security seriously, the board would fire him.  If 
I were on the board, I would fire him. Any smart software vendor will talk 
big about security, but do as little as possible, because that's what makes 
the most economic sense. (Schneier 2004) 
In contrast, systems built with single-purpose hardware such as application-
specific integrated circuits lack the ability to deviate from their programming (Null and 
Lobur 2006, 716).  To use this option, developers must capture the functionality of the 
system and build those functions into the hardware itself.  While appealing from a 
security perspective, this option presents major problems with development.  
Development of complex computerized systems uses an iterative approach, where 
functions are built, tested, integrated, and tested again (Larman 2006).  Each round of 
testing can uncover flaws in the programming that must be fixed for the next version.  
Furthermore, users often change their requirements during and after development as they 
gain proficiency with the new system and conceive of new functions.  Making all those 
changes in software alone is a reasonable task—one with which most developers are 
familiar since the commercial and educational environments use those skills and 
techniques.  Trying to revise the design of an integrated circuit and produce a new sample 
for each round of testing, however, would be prohibitively expensive and time-
consuming and is not a practical approach. 
Given the need to build military systems upon general-purpose commercial 
hardware and software, developers must devote their attention to those remote-access 




capabilities that allow software updates in the field, remote-configuration tools that allow 
control and configuration of deployed elements, and communication links used to 
exchange sensor data and command and control information. 
Remote-update capabilities, where system administrators push software updates 
to network hosts, present a major security challenge to the integrity of executable code.  
These features rely upon authentication and integrity techniques to ensure that only 
appropriate connections are allowed and that the received data has not been altered.  An 
adversary who exploits some weakness in these protective measures and impersonates a 
trusted network member can gain the ability to reprogram the victim node to perform any 
function desired by that adversary.  These programming attacks can shut down the node, 
corrupt data, or open a communications channel back to the adversary to relay network 
information (Harris 2006, 1044). 
Remote-configuration tools present less of a threat since they lack the 
infrastructure to directly alter the executable code.  These functions would be especially 
relevant to unmanned vehicles and sensors that cannot be commanded by a physically-
present operator.  An adversary impersonating an authorized network member could shut 
down or otherwise mis-configure these vehicles and sensors. 
Absent any direct access to the executable code or configuration functions, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, attackers could still exploit weaknesses in the 
communications links that form a fundamental part of any network-centric system.  
These weaknesses can include unusual or boundary conditions, buffer overflows, and 
injection attacks.  Each of these scenarios involves some malicious string of data being 
passed to the victim node and having some unexpected and detrimental effect. 
Attacks involving unusual or boundary conditions rely on the fact that complex 
systems have so many possible permutations of incoming data that developers cannot test 
them all.  An algorithm written with the assumption that incoming data will conform to 
certain ranges and formats, may produce an unstable condition when the incoming data 
fails to obey those assumptions.  For example, the F-22 fighter’s avionics system failed 
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when the plane crossed the international dateline because of a programming error (CNN 
2007).  While most examples of this type of problem involve functionality failures, an 
attacker could inject data strings to produce similar results. 
Additionally, buffer overflows have been used for decades and still present 
security risks to computers.  Buffers are the memory storage areas reserved by the 
program to receive incoming data.  If the incoming data transmission is larger than the 
buffer space, that data could possibly overwrite some of the executable code.  A well-
crafted buffer overflow attack can cause the program to execute part of that transmitted 
data as program code, permitting the attacker to conduct a small-scale reprogramming 
and insert malicious code such as viruses or worms (McClure, Scambray, and Kurtz 
2005, 218–20). 
Even when systems prevent buffer overflows, injection attacks can take advantage 
of systems where commands are transmitted together with the data.  These systems use 
specific alphanumeric strings, special characters, or some other mechanism to 
differentiate command signals from data (McClure, Scambray, and Kurtz 2005, 561–2).  
An attacker with network access and knowledge of these command signals could perform 
the same kind of remote-configuration attacks discussed earlier even if the system lacks a 
dedicated control mode. 
Defense against attacks that use unexpected inputs, boundary conditions, buffer 
overflows, or command injections requires developers to consider all possible 
combinations of input data in code analysis and testing.  Developers should also use 
bounds-checking functions that filter out ranges of data that could never be received in an 
operational environment.  The field of software safety provides useful ideas for 
protecting security by suggesting the operation of a separate, parallel function that 
monitors system behavior and takes action when the system does something unexpected 
or unsafe.  Many networks already use intrusion detection or prevention systems to 
perform this independent monitoring function.  Developers must also scrutinize 
commercial code intended for use in the system, remove any unnecessary functions and 
interfaces, and insert bounds-checking functions where needed (Joint Software System 
Safety Committee, E-10). 
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In addition to the scenarios above where attackers try to inject bogus data or 
malicious commands into the system, many other avenues of technological attack exist.  
The specifics of these techniques are beyond the scope of this thesis and depend upon the 
hardware, software, and protocol configuration in use.  Some of the risk comes from the 
same viruses, worms, and other malicious code that regularly threatens commercial 
computer networks.  If the network-centric weapon system includes commercial 
hardware and software, it must include the same defensive measures used by commercial 
networks to prevent malicious code from executing.  These measures include strict 
configuration management that requires new code to be tested prior to installation, the 
use of access controls so operational users cannot install software, and anti-virus software 
running on developmental machines to prevent viruses from attaching themselves during 
system development. 
Developers must decide whether their executable code and algorithms should be 
kept secret or made available to the public.  This decision mirrors the same issue with 
cryptographic algorithms and has the same risks and benefits to both options.  The DoD 
has begun to recognize the value of open-source software, where the source code is 
published for everyone to see and members of the public can contribute code via the 
project team, and has established the “Forge.mil” Web site.  This website builds on the 
open-source model of the SourceForge website that provides the infrastructure for 
community collaboration on software projects.  Using the “Forge.mil” website, 
developers of military systems can subject their code to public scrutiny and benefit from 
their observations and contributions. 
Security for executable code (i.e., the ability of software to resist attacks) 
depends, just as in the cryptography scenario, upon the secrecy of configuration settings 
and cryptographic keys.  Developers who choose to keep their algorithms secret may 
achieve some additional “security through obscurity,” but they must not rely upon the 
algorithm or code secrecy to provide security.  Any elements that provide security must 
be easily and quickly replaceable in the event these elements are compromised, and the 
source code would require a great deal of time and effort to replace. 
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Much of the security effort for computerized systems focuses on managing 
complexity.  Developers use tools like security policies and security architectures to 
understand the structure of the system and control the ways that different components can 
interact.  Since attackers can break into the system through poorly designed or mis-
configured interfaces, these tools help minimize the complexity and remove unnecessary 
interconnects. 
The security policy defines the system’s requirements with respect to security.  It 
identifies and prioritizes assets necessary to carry out the military missions, establishes 
the goals regarding protection of information, and defines organizational duties and 
authorities.  The security policy emerges from an examination of the threats against the 
system and serves to defend against those threats—but only where the risk exceeds the 
cost of the defense.  Broad policy statements act as the basis for security standards and 
guidelines, which create rules governing the legal behavior of the system.  The standards 
and guidelines provide the basis for detailed operating and administrative procedures that 
direct the actions of operators and maintainers (Harris 2008, 110–5). 
The security architecture provides an abstract representation of the components 
and interconnections of a system.  It captures the functions performed by each  
component and the data flow throughout the network.  Developers use a security 
architecture to illustrate which components need to communicate and which ones must be 
isolated.  Designing the components around the architecture helps to ensure that modules 
communicate efficiently without violating the security policy.  Defining and using the 
security architecture is a key effort in systems engineering that helps developers reduce 
system complexity and better understand the system’s design (Anderson 2008, 657–9). 
One option for a security architecture is the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).  The 
TCB represents the combination of all security protection mechanisms within the system, 
including hardware, software, and firmware.  By using a TCB, developers can create a 
small, simple, and reliable construct that manages system processes in a way that 
enforces the security policy.  Capturing the protection mechanisms in the TCB allows 
developers of the rest of the system to devote their effort to the features, reliability, and  
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usability aspects of operation without having to worry as much about security.  It also 
allows functionality changes to be installed without changing the security posture of the 
system (Harris 2008, 321–6). 
A TCB could include a reference monitor that mediates access between users and 
data files.  It could also provide for a security kernel as the hardware, software, and 
firmware within the TCB that implements the concept of the reference monitor.  The 
reference monitor concept plays a major role in protecting the confidentiality of systems 
that process information of different classification.  Chapter III describes the reference 
monitor in greater detail. 
C. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION 
Testing and certification for security differs from testing and certification carried 
out to prove the functionality of software.  In the functionality case, tests capture the most 
likely scenarios, configurations, and data communications.  Failures of functionality tests 
can be easily detected through improper system behavior or incorrect data processing.  
Because security problems often emerge from unexpected situations and since testing 
alone cannot capture every possible permutation of inputs and system conditions, security 
certification must also rely upon an examination of the program design.  This 
examination looks for both the presence of security protective features and the proper 
design and implementation of the code.  Most importantly, it verifies that the security 
policy, which specifies the legal behavior for the system, is properly implemented and 
will be enforced. 
To test and certify the computer and network security of a system under 
development, industry and the DoD often rely upon an international program called the 
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CNSS 2003, 2).  This 
program, sponsored by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology and 
National Security Agency, in addition to similar organizations in 25 other countries, 
provides a framework for evaluating the security of both hardware and software.  The 
Common Criteria evaluation studies the degree of assurance that the product under 
consideration properly implements its security functions.  Each evaluation tests a product, 
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called the Target of Evaluation, (TOE) in one specific configuration and operational 
environment.  A document called a Security Target defines the security properties of the 
TOE and may include one or more Protection Profiles, which capture the 
implementation-independent security requirements for a given class of device.  These 
security properties in the Security Target document include Security Functional 
Requirements, which specify functions that the TOE must perform, and Security 
Assurance Requirements, which describe the measures taken during development to 
ensure that the security functions will operate properly (Signatories of the Common 
Criteria Recognition Agreement 2009). 
The evaluation verifies that the Security Functional Requirements are satisfied 
and rates the Security Assurance Requirements by providing an Evaluation Assurance 
Level (EAL) of one to seven, with seven being the highest assurance.  Higher levels 
require increasingly more rigorous and formal design and testing and an accordingly 
higher cost for development.  The formal mathematical methods used to prove the 
security of systems seeking a high EAL drive developers to design those products in 
accordance with the evaluation criteria (Signatories of the Common Criteria Recognition 
Agreement 2009). 
The evaluation also verifies that the security policy has internal consistency, the 
security architecture faithfully matches the policy, and the design correctly implements 
the architecture.  These processes take a great deal of time and money, delaying product 
deployment and driving costs beyond the ability of some programs to handle.  The time 
and cost of an evaluation grows with both the EAL desired and the size of the TOE, so 
schedule and budget pressures may drive program managers to settle for a lower EAL 
than they might otherwise desire.  Evaluations oriented toward a lower EAL skip the 
formal mathematical verification of the security model and present a risk that the model 
may contain vulnerabilities (Signatories of the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement 
2009). 
The evaluation process also complicates the configuration management of the 
deployed system.  Since the evaluation examines the TOE in one specific configuration 
and environment, changes to the code may invalidate the evaluation and require an 
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update.  A program using incremental and evolutionary development methods may not be 
able to afford the time or money required to re-evaluate each version of the system.  Use 
of a TCB with a security kernel and reference monitor may avoid these problems by 
grouping functionality changes outside the part of the system that requires security 
evaluation.  The conflict between the desire for agile development and the need for 
evaluated security requires further research in the field of network-centric system 
acquisition. 
Testing the hardware and software for security flaws provides some assurance 
about system security; however, it cannot guarantee the security of the system against all 
technical attacks.  Attackers have an effectively infinite variety of methods at their 
disposal, making it impossible to test for all possible attacks.  The limited value of testing 
underscores the value of a secure design, making essential for developers to include 
security requirements in all stages of design rather than simply trying to add security 
features to an already-built product.  As Bruce Schneier noted, 
The real lesson is that the patch treadmill doesn't work, and it hasn't for 
years.  This cycle of finding security holes and rushing to patch them 
before the bad guys exploit those vulnerabilities is expensive, inefficient, 
and incomplete.  We need to design security into our systems right from 
the beginning.  We need assurance.  We need security engineers involved 
in system design.  This process won't prevent every vulnerability, but it's 
much more secure — and cheaper — than the patch treadmill we're all on 
now.  What a security engineer brings to the problem is a particular 
mindset.  He thinks about systems from a security perspective.  It's not that 
he discovers all possible attacks before the bad guys do; it's more that he 
anticipates potential types of attacks, and defends against them even if he 
doesn't know their details.  I see this all the time in good cryptographic 
designs.  It's over-engineering based on intuition, but if the security 
engineer has good intuition, it generally works.  Kaminsky's vulnerability 
is a perfect example of this.  Years ago, cryptographer Daniel J. Bernstein 
looked at DNS security and decided that Source Port Randomization was a 
smart design choice.  That's exactly the work-around being rolled out now 
following Kaminsky's discovery.  Bernstein didn't discover Kaminsky's 
attack; instead, he saw a general class of attacks and realized that this 
enhancement could protect against them.  Consequently, the DNS program 
he wrote in 2000, djbdns, doesn't need to be patched; it's already immune 
to Kaminsky's attack.  That's what a good design looks like.  It's not just 
secure against known attacks; it's also secure against unknown attacks.  
We need more of this, not just on the internet but in voting machines, ID 
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cards, transportation payment cards ... everywhere.  Stop assuming that 
systems are secure unless demonstrated insecure; start assuming that 
systems are insecure unless designed securely. (Schneier 2008a) 
Computer products used for the DoD also require certification and accreditation 
in accordance with DoD Directive 8500.01E and Intelligence Community Directive 503.  
While most of the technical work in this process examines the computer and network 
security of the system, the certification and accreditation process is designed to evaluate 
the security of the entire system.  Details on this process will be provided in the Chapter 
VII discussion on whole-system security. 
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III. INFORMATION SECURITY 
A shift to network-centric warfare would require the interconnection of combat 
units, sensors, logistics elements, intelligence analysts, and commanders.  Each of these 
units provides its own type of data to the network, ranging from unclassified data on 
spare parts supplies, to secret data on unit positions and status, to top-secret “sensitive 
compartmented information” (SCI) data from surveillance satellites and covert sensors.  
However, not all users of the network have the security clearance and need-to-know 
required to gain access to all of that information.  This discrepancy between the 
sensitivity of information on the network and the authorization of network users to read, 
create, and modify that information means that the system must use rigorous controls to 
limit information access to authorized users.  Failure to enforce these controls can lead to 
information “spillage” outside of its approved domain and compromise of sensitive 
information to hostile forces. 
Office automation computer systems used by the military usually perform this 
access limitation function through the use of Multiple Independent Levels of Security 
(MILS).  This practice requires the creation of a separate network for each classification 
level.  Users wishing to exchange unclassified logistics or business information use an 
unclassified computer.  Those same users move to a secret-level computer to work on 
secret operational information and then move to a top-secret-level computer to process 
top-secret intelligence information.  The MILS architecture assumes that any user of a 
given system has the proper security clearance and formal access approval for all of the 
information on that system.  This security mode of operation is called “dedicated mode” 
when all users also have a need-to-know for all information and “system high mode” 
otherwise.  Systems containing SCI or special-access program information may operate 
in “compartmented security mode” when users have different formal access approvals 
and need-to-know (Harris 2008, 354). 
The MILS architecture works well for office workers who have room for multiple 
computers on their desks or in their workspaces.  It also works well where each type of 
information exists entirely on only one of the networks and does not span multiple 
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systems.  MILS presents major logistical problems, however, when users lack the ability 
to use multiple computers at one time or when information flows across different security 
domains.  Operators of airplanes, tanks, and infantry units lack the space for multiple 
computer systems, and their operations naturally combine data of many classifications 
and compartments onto a single operational picture. 
Network-centric weapon systems could solve the logistical and operational 
problems of the MILS architecture by using a Multi-Level Security (MLS) architecture.  
MLS allows data of different security classifications to be combined onto a single 
computer system and network.  To protect data confidentiality, MLS systems assign 
classification labels to each subject (users and user processes) and object (files and data 
elements), and ensures that subjects only access objects for which they possess an 
appropriate label.  For example, a user with a secret clearance would be granted access to 
secret, confidential, and unclassified information but not to top-secret information 
(Anderson 2008, 239–73). 
To enforce this label-based access control, MLS systems use a reference monitor 
and the Bell-LaPadula model.  A reference monitor is a small process operating in the 
security kernel of the operating system through which all information flow between users 
and data files must pass.  When implemented properly, the reference monitor cannot be 
modified or bypassed and is simple enough to be rigorously evaluated and proven secure.  
As a central part of the security architecture, it enforces the security policy and allows 
components to communicate with each other only when the messages conform to that 
policy (Harris 2008, 327–8). 
In the case of the Bell-LaPadula model of access control, the reference monitor 
prohibits reading information above the object’s clearance and also prevents writing 
information below the object’s clearance.  Both rules protect confidentiality, the first by 
prohibiting users from accessing information beyond their clearance and the second by 
preventing users from “spilling” information of one level onto a file with a lower 
classification level.  Depending on the application, developers may use other models 
where integrity takes priority over confidentiality.  For example, the Biba model defines  
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levels of integrity such that information with a high integrity label can be trusted more 
than information with a lower label.  The mechanisms of the Biba model work in the 
opposite manner as the Bell-LaPadula, so users cannot write up to higher integrity levels 
or read down to lower integrity levels (Harris 2008, 327–38). 
To access a MLS computer system, users log on and select a security level.  For 
example, a user cleared for Secret information can select a Secret, Confidential, or 
Unclassified level.  Selection of the correct security level depends upon the task at hand 
and can be changed if the user wants to start working on a different task.  It is essential to 
select the appropriate level because choosing a level too low for the task will prevent the 
user from being able to read the desired files; for example, a user logged on at an 
Unclassified level will be unable to access files labeled Secret.  Choosing a level too high 
for the task is also a problem because the classification label of any modified files will be 
changed to match the active security level.  For example, if a user logged on at a Secret 
level makes a change to an Unclassified file, that file’s security label will change to 
Secret and it will no longer be accessible at the Unclassified level. 
This need to operate at the correct security level for the task at hand can force 
users to change their security level frequently during the course of their work, depending 
upon how often these users need to access files of different classifications.  Desk-bound 
knowledge workers such as intelligence analysts or mission planners may find this 
security level switching an inconvenience, but a warfighter operating a network-centric 
weapon system would find it impossible to change logon contexts without causing a 
major operational disruption. 
Furthermore, MLS systems assume that each system will be accessed by only one 
person and that the user’s personal identification and authentication credentials 
correspond to that one person.  Again, this model works well for the knowledge workers 
who have their own computer terminals within their own individual workspaces, but 
warfighters typically do not enjoy these conditions.  Operators of network-centric weapon 
systems such as ship or tank crews often operate their terminals as a team.  Even if a 
terminal is primarily operated by one watchstander, its contents may be displayed to  
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several other people who are not identified and authenticated by the system.  Physical 
security controls can compensate for this problem by ensuring that everyone physically 
capable of observing or operating the terminal has a clearance and access equal to the 
primary operator who is logged in, but this workaround defeats the underlying 
assumption that all users are identified and authenticated before being granted access. 
A more appropriate architecture for connecting network nodes with different 
security levels can be built by using Cross-Domain Solutions (CDS).  A CDS describes 
the use of high-assurance guards and filters to allow the interconnection of network 
segments and elements that operate at different security levels without allowing 
information transfer into unauthorized areas.  These guards and filters examine the data 
trying to flow from a higher-security domain to a lower-security one and prevent any 
high-security data elements from passing through.  Configuration of a CDS can be 
complex depending upon the type of information exchanged, and any mis-configuration 
or failure to anticipate data types or formats could lead to the compromise of sensitive 
information. 
A CDS architecture provides a way for sensors, command centers, and weapon 
systems to share information without allowing complete visibility into all the information 
contained within each node.  For example, a remote sensor that provides data at the Top 
Secret SCI level can feed its data to a command center approved to handle that level of 
information.  The command center can then strip away data elements that identify the 
information’s source and method of collection, thus reducing its classification level to 
Secret, and send the contact report to a contact database for sharing with warfighters.  
The guard connecting the command center and the contact database uses a customized 
algorithm to examine the command center’s transmission for any information above the 
Secret level and blocks any such data. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6211.02C governs the process 
for developing and getting approval to operate a CDS.  This process ties into the overall 
certification and accreditation process that will be described in Chapter VII.  A CDS does 
not provide the same rigorous security as a MLS system, but it can allow greater  
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operational flexibility with an acceptable level of risk, especially for systems that  
communicate with fixed message formats.  The use of fixed message formats makes it 
difficult for buggy or malicious processes to send sensitive information into lower-
security domains. 
Even a well-designed CDS or MLS system can still fall victim to an attack on 
confidentiality through the use of covert channels and traffic analysis.  A covert channel 
is any unusual or unexpected method of bypassing the security mechanism and sending 
highly sensitive information to a lower-security domain.  For example, if some network 
resource is visible to both the high and low sides of a network, the high side could send 
information to the low side by changing some characteristic of the shared resource.  This 
example would require both sides of the network to have some covert program installed 
that can translate the changes in the network resource into a digital data stream.  Since 
covert channels can use a vast array of methods, implementing a system that provably 
does not leak information is extremely challenging (Anderson 2008, 263–5). 
The concept of distributed information sharing resembles the current discussion in 
industry about “Cloud Computing” and Service Oriented Architectures.  Cloud 
Computing refers to the infrastructure that allows information and services to be hosted 
in a central location and provided to users upon demand.  A related concept, Service 
Oriented Architecture refers to the standardization and centralization of computing 
services so they can be used by multiple units of a larger organization (Hurwitz et al. 
2007).  Information stored within the network, rather than locked up inside one isolated 
unit, can improve the situational awareness of the friendly forces but also be at greater 
risk of compromise.  Developers must decide carefully the maximum sensitivity of 
information allowed to be stored within the larger network.  This decision requires a risk 
analysis of the methods of compromise and the tactical advantages of having the 
information in a distributed form (Zittrain 2009). 
In addition to information, security classifications can also be applied to 
hardware.  Assigning a classification level places requirements for storage and handling  
that seek to prevent theft or sabotage.  In practice, however, it is difficult to classify  
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hardware because the security controls may place a significant burden on operators and 
maintainers.  Developers must seek a balance between the need for efficient handling and 
the need to prevent theft and loss (Boak 1973, 22). 
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IV. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Physical security for a network-centric weapon system goes beyond the “gates, 
guards, and guns” that form the core of physical security in a generic military context.  
Since the components of this system—the tanks, planes, ships, and troops—will be 
involved in combat and combat-support operations, they have different physical security 
needs than buildings and bases.  Enemy forces can still threaten the system, however, in 
three ways that involve physical contact with the hardware.  First, they can salvage 
functioning network hardware from captured friendly units and use that hardware to 
monitor communications and transmit false information.  Second, they can corrupt the 
manufacturing process of the system hardware and implant their own hardware devices 
that perform some malicious function.  Third, they can simply destroy the network nodes 
and remove the ability of system units to communicate with each other. 
A. EAVESDROPPING AND SPOOFING USING CAPTURED HARDWARE 
Most computer security scenarios involve an attacker intercepting network 
communications or, in the worst case, remotely accessing a network host and planting a 
malicious program.  With network-centric weapon systems, however, comes the 
additional problem of physical attacks on the computer hardware itself.  Since the 
networking hardware will be installed on ships, tanks, planes, and even infantry units, it 
must be assumed that the enemy will at some point gain physical possession of that 
hardware.  Once this happens, the hardware can be used to eavesdrop on friendly 
communications or insert false information.  If the system is still functioning, the enemy 
may have access to the entire situational awareness picture, knowing everything the 
friendly forces know and, most importantly, which enemy forces are still undetected 
(Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications 2000, 180). 
Operators may have the opportunity to perform an emergency destruction when 
capture becomes likely.  Such procedures usually focus on cryptologic keys hardware but 
can extend to all sensitive equipment.  These procedures, however, assume that operators 
will have the time and ability to conduct a thorough destruction and that the enemy will 
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be unable to reconstruct the destroyed equipment.  Designing for emergency destruction 
can be a challenge since operators need robust equipment that survives the rigors of 
combat.  This very quality of robust design makes hardware difficult to destroy 
intentionally and more likely to fall into enemy hands (Boak 1973, 47). 
An attacker who gains possession of a functioning network hardware unit can try 
to access any information stored within that unit’s memory.  This information can include 
a recent situational awareness picture—a summary of the positions and status of all 
friendly units and the estimated position and status of any detected enemy units.  The 
attacker might also try to recover any cryptographic keys stored in the unit and used for 
authentication and message encryption.  All this information would be stored in volatile 
memory (e.g., memory chips) and non-volatile memory (e.g., flash memory or disk 
drives), and since this hardware will likely be built to commercial standards it may not be 
too difficult to copy and read this information.  Law enforcement units commonly do this 
as a forensic analysis of computers seized from criminal suspects (Harris 2008, 876–9). 
System developers can use tamper resistance to make it difficult for attackers to 
extract information from captured hardware.  For example, the IBM 4758 processor 
responds to tamper attempts in hardware by quickly zeroizing its secrets 
and executing a coprocessor state change, without requiring software 
intervention.  Temper conditions include penetration attempts, temperature 
extremes, voltage variation, and radiation. (Dyer et al. 2001 60)   
However, perfect tamper resistance is impossible to achieve, and designers cannot 
objectively determine how tamper-proof their hardware is (Schneier 2000, 215).  The 
tamper-resistance challenge is complicated by attacks that use non-invasive methods that 
would not trigger a reaction from the target hardware.  For example, Paul Kocher’s 
differential power analysis technique, created in 1998 to extract the private key from 
smart cards, measures the power used during several hundred known transactions with 
the card to deduce the key value (Anderson 2008, 533). 
Tamper-resistant designs must compete against an ever-improving array of 
forensic tools and techniques that can extract data from seemingly secure products.  
Recent demonstrations have shown that data in volatile memory chips can be extracted 
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by cooling them down before removing them from the target computer (Jackson 2008).  
Hard drives or flash memory chips can be copied and subjected to brute-force attacks on 
any encrypted contents.  Attackers can re-construct deleted data from any magnetic 
medium by looking for the minute traces of residual magnetism left behind after files are 
deleted or overwritten (Anderson 2008, 490).  Overall, it is exceptionally difficult to 
protect information when the medium that holds it is in enemy hands. 
The use of asymmetric encryption can reduce the risk that the enemy will recover 
a cryptographic key from a captured hardware device and use that key to intercept 
friendly communications.  By recovering a unit’s secret key, the attacker can only 
decrypt messages sent to that particular device.  Likewise, with the effort to use the 
captured unit to inject false information into the friendly network, recovering a secret key 
would allow the attacker to impersonate only that specific device.  If the friendly network 
uses a robust PKI and the loss of the friendly unit is noted, network administrators can 
place that unit’s PKI certificate onto a certificate revocation list and prevent friendly units 
from trusting any further messages from that unit. 
In addition to using captured hardware to steal secrets and send bogus 
information, attackers can also conduct reverse-engineering activities to learn the details 
of the hardware designs.  Once the designs are well understood, an industrially 
sophisticated enemy can then manufacture their own versions of the units and use these in 
the field to disrupt the friendly network or to impersonate friendly units and inject false 
information.  Careful use of cryptographic authentication, such as that provided by a PKI, 
would limit the effectiveness of these attacks, and make imposter units capable of little 
more than low-level jamming and noisemaking. 
The reverse-engineering threat also extends to the software and firmware resident 
on any captured hardware.  Even though any code would exist only in the form of binary 
executables (instead of source code), adversaries could use reverse code engineering tools 
like disassemblers and debuggers to reconstruct the source code and learn the details of 
the algorithms in use.  They could use this knowledge to discover weaknesses in the 
processing algorithms and develop new code-based attacks (Peikari and Chuvakin 2004, 
9). 
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B. MALICIOUS HARDWARE 
The hardware supporting network-centric operations may fall into enemy hands 
during its construction as well.  The use of commercial hardware designs and fabrication 
means that the physical production of processor chips will take place outside of direct 
military observation and control.  This is especially true for hardware produced overseas, 
where factory managers may face pressure from intelligence services that may be hostile 
to the United States (King et al. 2008). 
Just as malicious code can be introduced into software or firmware, it can also be 
embedded into the design of microprocessor hardware.  A hostile production facility can 
create back-door access points, logic bombs designed to cause failures when certain 
conditions are met, or covert transmission functions that send data to hostile collection 
points or introduce flaws in the cryptographic functions.  Detecting these functions can 
prove extremely difficult as they consist of minor variations in the arrangement of the 
millions of transistors and connections found on modern processors (King et al. 2008). 
To mitigate the risk of malicious hardware, program managers must provide 
oversight and security for their entire supply chain.  They should inspect the final design 
of custom-made hardware and ensure that the fabrication process faithfully reproduces 
that design.  Many hardware designs will use existing commercial processors, meaning 
that the chips were designed before they were selected for military use and therefore it is 
unlikely that an adversary would have implanted a military-specific malicious process.  
In this case, the program manager must ensure that the production process does not get 
altered and that the units supplied to the military project are identical to those provided to 
the commercial market.  Finally, programs may decide to avoid certain vendors when the 
risk is too high, such as when the DoD canceled its decision to buy SIPRNet computers 
from the Chinese-owned company Lenovo in 2006 (U.S. Congress 2008, 73). 
The risks from malicious hardware may not exceed the risks created from the lack 
of security effort put into commercial software, but both parts of the supply chain require 
careful attention.  Dr. James Mulvenon, testifying before Congress in 2008, said, 
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I would obviously agree that the supply chain is a big problem, 
particularly given the increasing percentage of these products that are 
being manufactured in China, the pressure that’s being put on some of 
these companies to include Chinese standards, which involves giving up 
source code for Chinese-designated companies to then be able to build the 
APIs to make them compatible with those Chinese standards.  But we 
should also look closer to home as well as in the sense that, as a Mac user 
since ’87, I can tell you that Microsoft and its buggy code probably 
represents a far graver information warfare threat to the United States than 
a lot of backdoor Chinese equipment.  But as long as we have a low bid 
acquisition strategy in that area, we’re going to go down that road, and it 
requires much more attention to code auditing and hardware auditing than 
we do right now.  (U.S. Congress 2008, 74) 
C. HARDWARE DESTRUCTION 
Much of the discussion about computer network security centers around the 
complex and obscure ways their programming can be altered or configurations changed.  
In a military situation, however, the quickest way to attack the availability of a network is 
to simply destroy some of the hardware.  As Bruce Schneier pointed out, “One of the 
characteristics of denial-of-service attacks is that low-tech is often better than high tech: 
Blowing up a computer center works much better than exploiting a Windows 2000 
vulnerability” (Schneier 2000, 39).  A dispersed network that includes warfighters, 
commanders, and sensors would require a great deal of hardware to propagate the signals 
throughout the network, and this hardware would include relay stations on satellites, 
planes, ships, and ground vehicles and facilities.  These relay stations would serve to 
collect messages from nearby units and re-transmit them to other units and relay stations, 
eventually delivering the message to the entire network.  Destroying some of these 
stations could effectively remove some of the nodes off the network and therefore make 
them unable to contribute to the tactical operations. 
Destroying these network relay stations could prove especially easy, especially 
when compared to the effort needed to destroy actual warfighting units.  In order to reach 
a large number of network nodes, the relay stations would have to be positioned in an 
easily observed location.  They would also need to transmit more frequently and with 
higher power then the warfighting units or sensors, further raising their visibility.  
Unfortunately, a location visible to friendly forces would likely also be visible to enemy 
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ones.  The enemy may make his first strike focus on networking hardware, causing a 
long-term denial-of-service on the friendly network.  Robbed of their ability to 
communicate, friendly forces would have to revert to less-effective legacy radio links or 
just give up on communications and perform independent operations.  These independent 
operations are exactly the opposite of the integrated, network-centric operation for which 
the units were trained, so friendly forces would suffer a dramatic loss of effectiveness. 
The problem of vulnerability to physical attack is especially acute for satellites.  
The U.S. military has designed much of its communications infrastructure to rely on 
satellites, and a future network-centric architecture would likely follow this philosophy.  
Historically, orbital space has been a bastion for the U.S., but recent advances in anti-
satellite weapons have shown that hostile nations can knock them out.  China, in 
particular, has demonstrated the ability to destroy or disable satellites, and recent writings 
of the Chinese army suggest that satellites would be the first targets in a conflict with the 
U.S. (U.S. Congress 2008, 10).  
Given the difficulty of hardening or hiding network relay stations on the 
battlefield, the only remaining method of assuring availability may be the deployment of 
a large number of smaller and highly mobile stations.  Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) 
could serve this function well if they deployed in large numbers and formed a mobile ad-
hoc network to pass information.  Given a robust networking protocol that can quickly 
adapt to the loss of network members but not overwhelm the system with repetitive or 
circular traffic, friendly forces can replenish the UAVs as they are disabled and maintain 
network connectivity.  A large number of small satellites could also perform this 
function, replacing the small number of large and vulnerable satellites currently in use. 
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V. OPERATIONAL SECURITY 
The operational philosophy behind network-centric warfare assumes that 
warfighters, sensors, and commanders will have continuous data links available to share 
their contact information, status, and orders.  Unfortunately, radio transmissions can be 
easily detected by enemy forces, revealing the position and movement of friendly units 
and even providing some clues to the status of those units.  Since military tactics often 
rely on stealth and surprise, the emanations needed to participate in the network can leave 
friendly forces at a severe disadvantage.  Developers of network-centric systems, 
therefore, must consider the operational security needs of friendly forces to operate 
without detection from the enemy. 
The need to operate without detection greatly affects covert units such as 
submarines, stealth aircraft, and Special Forces units.  These units, termed disadvantaged 
users, typically operate without making any detectable emanations, allowing them to 
receive information from the network but not to transmit anything (Goshorn 2008, 3).  
They rely upon their covert status for mission effectiveness and even their survival since 
they lack the ability to withstand or repel a significant attack. 
The inability to transmit to the network presents both tactical and technical 
problems.  Tactically, the network-centric military of the future will adopt a doctrine that 
assumes connectivity among all warfighters, sensors, and commanders.  Units will train 
to use the common situational awareness picture created by all network nodes, and their 
tactics will be based on this information sharing.  The presence of friendly units operating 
off the network could complicate this tactical assumption and increase the risk of friendly 
fire. 
The technical problem comes from the possible use of a connection-oriented 
protocol for network communication.  Connection-oriented protocols establish a 
communications session between the sender and receiver as the first step of any 
information exchange, and they can authenticate each other and create a cryptographic  
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key just for that session.  Most importantly, they require both parties to acknowledge any 
data packets sent by the other party.  This acknowledgement ensures that all the data 
arrives intact (Comer 1999, 331). 
Any network member restricted from transmitting but still wishing to receive 
network information would be unable to use a connection-oriented protocol since they 
could not establish a session or acknowledge packets.  They would typically have to use a 
connectionless protocol to carry one-way data transfers.  Connectionless protocols are 
commonly used on the Internet to carry streaming audio and video feeds, and they 
provide no protection against data loss.  Corrupted packets may be recognized as such by 
the receiver and disregarded, but since the receiver has no way to ask for the packet to be 
re-sent, that data is lost (Harris 2008, 498–9). 
Reliance upon a connectionless protocol and its risk of data loss might be 
tactically acceptable for covert units if the network pushes frequent updates to situational 
awareness data and tactical orders.  In this situation, the information lost due to dropped 
packets can be revived in the next update, and the receiver can maintain an adequate 
tactical picture.  This solution, however, would increase the burden on tactical networks 
and place them at greater risk of overload. 
Network administrators would also face the difficult task of deciding where to 
provide broadcast coverage intended for these covert units.  Transmitting throughout the 
entire network would consume the available bandwidth and restrict the ability of the rest 
of the force to communicate.  Transmitting only in the geographic area where the covert 
units operate risks alerting enemy forces to the covert units’ presence, and it might not 
even be possible to arrange this type of coverage since the most covert operations are 
generally kept secret from the mainline forces.  Administrators must carefully balance the 
need for network capacity with the need to protect the secrecy of covert units. 
Covert units may be able to use Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) 
communications methods to achieve some degree of network participation.  LPI 
communications are wireless data transmissions that are difficult for anyone but the 
intended receiver to detect and are also difficult to jam (Boak 1973, 11).  Typical LPI 
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technologies make use of high-frequency radio transmissions using a high-gain, 
directional antenna (Carmana 2009, 2-AM-82).  Optical signals can be highly secure, 
though they can easily be blocked by clouds or smoke. 
Another operational security concern comes from an adversary’s ability to deduce 
important tactical information from reading patterns in friendly communications.  The 
adversary may not be able to decode and eavesdrop on these transmissions, but through 
analyzing the amount and location of transmissions they may be able to determine that 
some significant action is taking place.  This aspect of operational security is especially 
important before hostile action has actually started, since a spike in communications 
activity can tip off the enemy that a surprise attack is coming.  Friendly units can avoid 
giving away this type of information by maintaining a constant level of communications 
activity even when the messages contain no tactical information, filling their messages 
instead with “placeholder” data that is ignored by the recipient (Commission on Physical 
Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications 2000, 194). 
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VI. PERSONNEL SECURITY 
Human developers, users, and maintainers form a critical part of any military 
system, and a proper systems engineering effort must account for their contributions and 
limitations.  People can threaten the security of a system intentionally during the 
developmental or operational phase by conducting espionage or sabotage.  Even loyal 
and well-intentioned people can cause security problems by failing to follow security-
related procedures or by falling victim to social engineering attacks.  Developers must 
consider every aspect of human interaction and protect against the security risks that 
people bring to the system. 
A. THE HUMAN COMPONENT 
Any network-centric military system will include many people to design, build, 
maintain, and operate the hardware and software.  The fields of systems engineering and 
human factors engineering have advanced the concept that these people are integral parts 
of the system and that any design decisions must account for their actions and mistakes.  
As the DoD Office of Force Transformation stated, 
The implementation of NCW is first of all about human behavior as 
opposed to information technology.  Our focus should be on human 
behavior in the networked environment.  How do military forces behave, 
perform, and organize themselves when they are networked? (Office of 
Force Transformation 2005, 3) 
Accordingly, many security experts believe that people are the greatest security weakness 
in any computerized system.  As Bruce Schneier stated, “People often represent the 
weakest link in the security chain and are chronically responsible for the failure of 
security systems” (Schneier 2000, 255). 
The system life cycle includes human activities at every stage.  At system 
inception, people execute the three elements of the military’s procurement and 
sustainment system: the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process, the 
requirements development process, and the acquisition management process (DoD 2003).  
Once this system identifies needs, allocates funding, and assigns a program manager, 
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other people work to design and build the system.  The fielded system then requires other 
people to operate and maintain the hardware and software elements throughout the 
operational phase of the system life cycle.  Even at the end of system life, people are 
needed to oversee the decommissioning and disposal of hardware and software.  Every 
stage of the system life cycle requires people who must be trusted to perform their role 
properly, and the security risk to the system comes from people who intentionally or 
accidentally violate that trust. 
In any other aspect of security, technological methods can solve security 
vulnerabilities and reduce risks.  Rigorous design practices and thorough testing 
combined with a process of detecting new risks and quickly issuing patches or updates 
can eliminate most risks to computer and network security.  Meticulous labeling of 
information and design of information flows can eliminate most risks to information 
security.  Tamper-proofing, authentication techniques, and hardware redundancy can 
boost physical security.  LPI communication methods and connectionless protocols can 
provide operational security.  However, because human interaction involves judgment, no 
amount of technology-based techniques and tools can, by themselves, bring the personnel 
security risks to an acceptable level (Harris 2008, 135).  These tools can reduce the 
personnel-related security risks, but designers must consider human fallibility and 
incorporate procedures that anticipate the most likely human failures and minimize their 
likelihood and impact.  As Bruce Schneier stated, “Mathematics is logical; people are 
erratic, capricious, and barely comprehensible” (Schneier 2000, xii). 
Given the need for trusted human interactions in any complex system, designers 
must consider the ways that people can introduce security problems.  People can cause 
security violations intentionally or accidentally.  The intentional violations, espionage 
and sabotage, are the easiest to understand.  Accidental violations, however, can come 
from a wide variety of behaviors and situations and often involve a trade-off between 
security and functionality.  Designers must weigh the need for security with the 
efficiency, reliability, and ease of use of systems and provide both technological features 
and operational procedures to achieve an acceptable level of risk. 
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B. INTENTIONAL SECURITY VIOLATIONS 
The need to include fallible and unpredictable humans as critical components of 
complex systems, introduces the risk that some of those people may be working for the 
enemy as spies or saboteurs.  These people, whether they sympathize with the enemy or 
simply want fast cash and an exciting line of work, can give sensitive information to the 
enemy, inject false information into the network, and cause equipment failures and 
communication outages.  The immense complexity of a network-centric system can help 
these malicious insiders disguise their actions and avoid detection.  This malicious action 
can take place during system development and during the operation and support phase of 
the system life cycle. 
1. Developmental Stage Security 
During the developmental stage, enemy agents can collect system design and 
configuration information and leak it to hostile forces.  The improvements in digital 
information storage technology have made espionage easier and more efficient than it 
was in the days of the cold war, and vast quantities of information can be copied onto 
flash-memory devices and smuggled out of the building.  These devices, including 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) thumb drives, memory cards, portable hard drives, cell 
phones, and digital media players, will successfully interface with the computer hardware 
used in many development environments since the devices and hardware both conform to 
the same commercial open-architecture interface standards.  Armed with detailed design 
and configuration information, potential adversaries can search for system weaknesses 
and develop customized attacks for use if a conflict emerges.  States and trans-national 
organizations not directly involved in a conflict with the U.S. can provide these attack 
methods to those groups actually doing the fighting as “off-the-shelf” tools ready for 
immediate use (Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications 2000, 
177). 
Thefts of technical data may result from industrial espionage in addition to the 
nationally sponsored spying conducted for military purposes.  American technology 
companies face a significant threat of espionage from foreign companies, some of whom 
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are assisted by their governments (Epstein 2008).  If advanced technology information is 
stolen by a foreign entity, it may be sold to other companies and governments and used to 
create competitive products and to design the same customized attacks made possible 
from government-sponsored espionage.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, describing 
the threat from industrial sabotage, said, 
In a world that increasingly measures power in economic as well as 
military terms, many foreign intelligence services are turning their sights 
to stealing American technology and trade secrets.  Some countries with 
whom we have had good relations may adopt a two-track approach, 
cooperating with us at the level of diplomacy while engaging in 
adversarial intelligence collection. (Nolan 2000, 1) 
China presents a particular threat of industrial espionage.  They have a long 
history of reverse engineering and commonly use it to match competitor’s products and 
build new military hardware.  While military-developed products would require some 
degree of espionage, the commercial products that often form the foundation of military 
systems can be acquired simply by purchasing them (Fritz 2008, 33). 
Enemy agents, commercial spies, and disgruntled employees can also pose a 
sabotage threat.  Major software projects can be so complex that a small but malicious 
change in a code library may go unnoticed.  These changes can include back-door access 
points that can allow system access without proper authentication, logic bombs that 
degrade system performance or cause data errors when the system is used operationally, 
or covert channels that leak sensitive information without proper encryption or 
classification-checking controls.  Both espionage and sabotage by insiders share features 
that cause the event to take place and that help it happen successfully (Band et al. 2006, 
vii). 
Defending security during system development requires the standard tools used in 
government and commercial office settings.  People must pass background checks and 
hold an appropriate security clearance before being granted access to sensitive material.  
Administrators of the development system should remove any access points for digital 
media not needed for development work, including USB ports, CD and DVD recorders, 
and card readers.  Systems can also use software applications at the workstation and 
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network level to monitor information flow over the network and detect suspicious actions 
from users.  Network operations should be thoroughly logged, where the system records 
each operation in a log file, so security personnel can recognize security violations and 
identify the personnel responsible.  Code submitted to production libraries must be 
inspected and understood by more than its author.  All these security measures will add to 
the cost of development, but managers must resist the temptation to raid the security 
budget to make up for development cost overruns. 
The background checks and security clearances, while helpful for screening out 
people with known suspicious connections and activities, cannot predict anyone’s future 
activities or accurately judge a person’s true intentions and loyalties.  Program managers 
must, therefore, resist the temptation to downplay the likelihood of insider attacks simply 
because all the insiders have survived some vetting process.  Bruce Schneier, discussing 
the futility of using terrorist watch lists to prevent terrorist attacks, points out how 
identity cannot be correlated with intent: 
But even if these [terrorist watch] lists were complete and accurate, they 
wouldn't work.  Timothy McVeigh, the Unabomber, the D.C. snipers, the 
London subway bombers and most of the 9/11 terrorists weren't on any list 
before they committed their terrorist acts.  In the end, the photo ID 
requirement is based on the myth that we can somehow correlate identity 
with intent.  We can't.  And instead of wasting money trying, we would be 
far safer as a nation if we invested in intelligence, investigation, and 
emergency response — security measures that aren't based on a guess 
about a terrorist target or tactic. (Schneier 2008b) 
2. Operational Stage Security 
During system operations, administrators have the power to attack the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the network and its data.  The specific role 
and duties of these administrators depends upon the system design, but some degree of 
human intervention and supervision will be required for any type of system.  
Administrators could possibly link a covert enemy unit to the network, providing that unit 
with the locations, status, and orders of the entire friendly force as well as the complete 
description of sensor contacts and knowledge about the opposing force.  They could mis-
configure encryption settings to allow some part of the network to transmit its 
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information in the clear where it could be intercepted by hostile units.  They could attack 
the integrity of the network by directly editing data, changing friendly units to appear 
hostile, deleting enemy units from sensor reports, or creating bogus hostile units to serve 
as a diversion.  They could also damage the system’s availability by removing friendly 
units from the network or shutting down the network itself. 
The use of contractors to perform administrative and technical duties presents a 
special risk because military supervisors have less ability to screen and manage 
contractor personnel.  Unable to build technical expertise in-house, some companies, and 
government and military organizations rely on contractors and run the risk of becoming 
dependent upon them.  As an example of the risk that comes with contracted information 
technology (IT) administration, the World Bank recently experienced several major 
penetrations in their highly sensitive treasury unit.  The FBI discovered that spyware had 
been installed on servers and suspected that contractor personnel, who performed nearly 
all the bank’s IT services, were the culprits.  The bank terminated the contract with the 
company but found itself unable to operate without the contractor personnel because bank 
personnel lacked enough knowledge about the system to be able to operate it themselves.  
As a result, many of the contractors continued to work, either as employees of the 
replacement company or as newly hired bank staff.  The perpetrators were never 
discovered and the bank cannot be certain that they are not still working there in sensitive 
positions (Behar 2008). 
To protect their security from personnel-related risks, operational network-centric 
systems can borrow some of the practices, such as two-person control and controlled 
access, that are used by high-security programs.  The two-person control concept aims to 
make it impossible for one person to sabotage the system without their actions being 
discovered, reported, and corrected (Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and 
Applications 2000, 178).  Administrative-level access to the system, at least in areas that 
can damage confidentiality, integrity, and availability, should require the direct attention 
of at least two trained administrators.  This requirement must be more than a procedural 
requirement; the administrative software function should control access by requiring 
valid access credentials from two or more qualified personnel.  Once the participants are 
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identified and authenticated, the second person must observe the actions of the person 
actually operating the system and have the ability to stop the changes before they are 
promulgated to the system.  Defeating this security measure would require collusion 
between the two administrators, a highly unlikely situation that would be considered an 
acceptable risk (Harris 2008, 136). 
Logging of administrative actions is just as important to the operational system as 
it is in the developmental environment.  Administrators must access the system with 
unique user identification and authentication, preferably using two-factor authentication 
including a physical token such as a smart card.  Given this strict authentication, every 
administrative action can be recorded along with the identity of the person who took the 
action.  Careful log reviews may then detect suspicious actions or outright security 
violations and identify the responsible party.  To ensure that the logging system remains 
effective, it must be designed such that the log file cannot be altered and the logging 
function cannot be switched off or bypassed (Harris 2008, 245–6). 
C. ACCIDENTAL SECURITY VIOLATIONS 
Security violations caused by loyal and well-intentioned operators can cause 
damage similar to that done by spies and saboteurs.  Some people may be tricked by 
social engineering attacks into revealing secret information or granting system access to 
enemy agents.  Others may ignore security rules in order to boost productivity.  Unlike 
the case with intentional violations, these accidental events reveal systemic weaknesses 
that often require broad countermeasures to combat and may never be fully preventable. 
1. Social Engineering 
Some of the most notorious computer hackers, like Kevin Mitnick, found social 
engineering to be a more efficient method of penetrating computer system security than 
technological attacks (Schneier 2000, 267).  He, and many others, used fraud and 
deception to trick trusted insiders into revealing secret information or allowing him to 
access restricted parts of the system.  This type of attack can be used against any type of 
organization or system that includes people and is not restricted to computer-based or 
network-centric systems; however, they can prove especially effective against computer-
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based systems because of the inherent value of information like passwords and 
configuration settings and the damage that an attacker can cause when sensitive 
information is leaked. 
Social engineering uses the ancient arts of fraud and deception to prey upon the 
fundamental characteristics of human nature.  Most people want to be appreciated and 
will be tempted to bend the rules to help someone they believe deserves assistance and 
will show them appreciation (Schneier 2000, 268).  People also tend to view authority 
figures with a mixture of fear and respect and may yield to the demands of someone 
impersonating an authority figure.  Others simply wish to avoid conflict and may provide 
information or access to someone demanding it in order to get the person to leave.  Some 
people may fall victim to their own greed and break security rules in return for some 
tangible benefit, though this act would generally propel the “victim” into the category of 
a spy or saboteur and not a well-intentioned dupe. 
Compounding the vulnerability to social engineering attacks is the fact that people 
are often very good at self-deception.  They sometimes substitute wishful thinking and 
naïve assumptions for a sober analysis of the situation and the risks of breaking the rules 
(Paul, Niewoehner, and Elder 2007, 49).  People may fail to consider the risks of 
divulging sensitive information or to rigorously authenticate the people requesting this 
information because of the subconscious assumption that everything will end well 
because it has in the past. 
Defense against the social engineering attack relies on security training, the 
creation of a security-centered culture, and the enforcement of the principle of least 
privilege.  The training exposes personnel to the concept of the social engineering attack 
and to the techniques that attackers use to get information and access.  It establishes 
authentication requirements that personnel must enforce on anyone seeking information 
or access and it shows the consequences of failing to properly authenticate someone.  
Training provides little benefit by itself, but it creates the intellectual foundation for the 
security culture needed to ensure that the secure procedures and practices are actually 
followed. 
 59
A robust culture of security within an organization ensures that the information 
learned in training is consistently and correctly put to use.  Supervisors must demonstrate 
through word and action the importance of security.  They must conspicuously enforce 
security procedures and make security practices an important part of personnel 
evaluations, including awards and disciplinary actions.  They must also accept that 
security practices necessarily reduce productivity and ensure that personnel are never 
pressured to take shortcuts in order to meet an urgent deadline or production goal.  
Finally, senior personnel must set the example and scrupulously follow the security rules 
themselves.  This last point may be the most difficult from a cultural perspective, since 
senior personnel typically enjoy exemptions from policies that apply to rank-and-file 
personnel (e.g., reserved parking space, administrative support); however, it is vital that 
security practices and rules are perceived as being a legitimate precaution that applies 
across the board, and not simply an indication of rank and status. 
System developers and administrators can also use technological means to help 
reduce the risk of social engineering attacks (Schneier 2000, 268).  Although hardware 
and software tools cannot prevent personnel from divulging information or granting 
access to an attacker, they can reduce the damage inflicted by such an error.  System 
administrators must vigorously apply the principle of least privilege and only allow 
personnel to access information and systems they need for their duties.  
Compartmentalizing information in this manner ensures that few personnel have the 
ability to give away “the keys to the kingdom” and that compromises of data and access 
damage only the area under the victim’s immediate control.  Other technological tools 
that can help organizations resist social engineering attacks are those that allow personnel 
to reliably authenticate anyone asking for information or access.  For example, use of 
digital signatures on emails reduce the risk that an attacker can impersonate someone 
inside the organization and extract information from an unwitting co-worker. 
2. Security Procedures 
Any system with human operators will likely require some kind of operator action 
to maintain the security of the system.  Such actions may include activating an encrypted 
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channel or using a low-probability-of-intercept method of communications.  The system 
and component design will determine what operator actions are available and necessary 
for security.  This design may force operators to operate in a secure mode by disallowing 
any other option, or it may provide greater operational flexibility but rely on operators to 
make the most prudent choice. 
A well-designed network-centric weapon system would naturally rely far less 
upon operator actions to maintain security than a typical computer network used for 
office automation or electronic commerce.  Commercial systems, in particular, must 
remain open to a wide variety of un-authenticated users with hardware and software 
operating according to open architecture standards.  Even if the sensitive parts of the 
system use authentication and other security measures, the open and less-protected 
interface to the general public allows attackers an avenue to gain access and work their 
way into the protected areas.  In contrast, a network-centric military system has no need 
to allow access to anyone but an authorized user who can prove his identity and will use 
specific hardware, software, and protocols to gain access.  Therefore, the military system 
can often use technological countermeasures to provide security and prohibit operator 
actions that introduce security risks. 
The system design may provide some method of bypassing or overriding security 
procedures for operation during an emergency when the normal procedures are infeasible.  
For example, a radio may allow operators to establish an unencrypted connection if the 
authentication/encryption process fails and the operator has an urgent need to 
communicate.  Such flexibility could improve the reliability of the networking equipment 
and provide a backup method of operation, preventing a failure of a security-related 
function from automatically becoming a failure of the entire network.  The degree of 
freedom given to operators to perform this security override will depend upon the system 
design, but any design will rely upon the operator’s security-related actions to some 
degree. 
While providing the ability to operate in a less-secure configuration may improve 
reliability, it also counts on the operator’s judgment to only operate in this manner when 
necessary.  Unfortunately, operators may lack a sufficient understanding of and 
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appreciation for security and may start bypassing security-related procedures to improve 
productivity and ease of use.  Pressured to “Just get it done,” some operators may view 
security rules as unnecessary obstacles and avoid them, opening a vulnerability that can 
be exploited by a hostile force.  The high turnover in the military and the life-and-death 
tactical concerns mean that security knowledge may be a low priority for operators. 
Protecting system security from this abuse of operator discretion requires actions 
similar to those needed to protect against the social engineering attack.  Operators must 
be trained on the importance of secure operation and the risks of taking shortcuts.  
Supervisors must set clear standards on secure operating practices and consistently 
enforce them while setting the example through their own behavior.  The system should 
log all non-standard operations to help supervisors enforce the standards and understand 
the real-world use of the system. 
Developers must also understand what kinds of personnel-related attacks on the 
system work and why.  Users sometimes disregard security indicators and focus on 
content, particularly when warnings are over-used due to system mis-configurations or 
software errors.  Therefore, the system must not rely upon users to seek out security 
indicators and scrupulously obey security warnings.  Even security-conscious users can 
be fooled by visual deception attacks that create false security indicators to mask 
malicious activity (Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst 2006, 3). 
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VII. WHOLE SYSTEM SECURITY 
As the previous chapters have explained, attacks on the security of network-
centric military systems can take a wide variety of forms.  Focusing security efforts only 
on one aspect—computer and network security, for example—would leave the system 
vulnerable to unexpected attacks from other avenues.  According to Arthur Cebrowski, 
Implementation of NCW must look beyond the acquisition of the technical 
enablers to individual and organizational behavior, e.g., organizational 
structure, processes, tactics, and the way choices are made. In other words, 
all elements of the enterprise are in play. (Office of Force Transformation 
2000, i) 
System developers must embrace a systems engineering approach to security and 
consider all the threats and vulnerabilities facing the system in the larger context of its 
operational environment.  This examination must include not only the technical 
characteristics of the components but also the people who operate and maintain the 
system, the support elements that keep the system running, and the environment in which 
the system will operate.  As Bruce Schneier noted when discussing cryptography, 
 The weak points had nothing to with mathematics.  They were in the 
hardware, the software, the networks, and the people.  Beautiful pieces of 
mathematics were made irrelevant through bad programming, a lousy 
operating system, or someone’s bad password choice. (Schneier 2000, xii)  
Once they identify the system-level risks and create security requirements to address 
those risks, the engineers can allocate those requirements into detailed features and 
characteristics that meet the system’s needs. 
The systems-based approach applies even within security domains such as 
computer and network security.  Adversaries may avoid the highly protected tactical 
network and focus their efforts on less-protected areas such as logistics systems.  These 
lower-profile systems can provide both an entry point into tactical systems and a source 
of information that can infer the movements, status, and intentions of friendly forces.  For 
example, seemingly innocent information on logistics preparations and reconnaissance  
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operations can signal the timing of an attack (Boak 1973, 4).  Furthermore, it may be 
possible to defeat the entire system by crippling its supporting infrastructure.  According 
to John Tkacik, 
The Chinese military doctrine stresses the importance of penetrating an 
adversary's military logistics and personnel networks.  Furthermore, the 
multiple intrusions into what nuisance and criminal hackers would regard 
as boring, mundane networks — networks that do not offer the treasure 
trove of credit card numbers, bank accounts, and identity data that 
criminal hackers typically seek — suggest a military purpose. (Tkacik 
2008, 3) 
Given that the number and types of risks are virtually unlimited and that the 
resources to mitigate those risks are highly constrained, the other task for systems 
engineers is to evaluate the relative efficiency of security-related attacks and apply the 
development effort to combat the most likely and effective attacks.  This task requires a 
great deal of judgment since the risks tend to be subjective and speculative, but a detailed 
failure analysis study combined with close attention to real-world security violations in 
computer-intensive systems should help developers quantify the risks and assign a 
relative priority. 
Developers must also indirectly boost the security of the system by making the 
design as simple as possible.  According to Bruce Schneier, 
Complexity is the worst enemy of security.  As systems get more complex, 
they necessarily get less secure. (Schneier 2000, 1) 
Simpler systems enjoy greater security because of the reduced number of opportunities to 
attack the system through unexpected inputs or configurations.  They present an easier 
management task for administrators and operators, reducing the likelihood of inadvertent 
security violations.  They also make easier subjects for technical evaluation, allowing a 
more thorough analysis and a more confident declaration of the security of the design. 
The security problems brought about by complexity may be especially difficult 
for a network-centric weapon system.  Such a system will likely be formed from a wide 
variety of components, each optimized for the special requirements of the forces and 
commanders using them.  Current methods may provide an assurance that each 
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component can operate securely, but this assurance does not extend to each combination 
of components operating together in a tactical network.  The problem compounds even 
more when systems of allied nations join the network.  Managing this complexity 
requires the creation of a security architecture that specifies the components of the system 
and their interactions.  This architecture simplifies the task of security analysis by 
allowing developers to operate at a high level of abstraction with regard to system 
elements. 
A. TEST AND EVALUATION 
Once the developers complete a preliminary design of the system, they can use 
penetration testing to discover overlooked vulnerabilities.  This kind of testing uses a “red 
team” of creative people who have significant training and experience in attacking 
networked systems to attack the system and record the outcome of their efforts.  To be 
effective, this testing should impose as few constraints as possible on the team.  The team 
should be given general information about the system and its configuration, especially if 
the system uses commercial components, in an effort to best simulate an attack from a 
sophisticated foreign power.  They should work not only to attack the system but also to 
find novel ways of circumventing the security-related countermeasures.  Even the most 
rigorous penetration testing cannot detect all possible vulnerabilities, however, since the 
number of possible attacks is essentially infinite and since a real attacker may conceive of 
an attack method unimagined and untested by the red team (Harris 2008, 1090–8). 
This penetration testing effort can be part of the larger developmental testing 
effort.  Developmental testing, as described in DoD Instruction 5000.02, subjects the 
system to a set of planned, controlled, and complete scenarios to verify that the security 
functions operate properly.  Since this testing takes place in a controlled environment and 
is conducted by developmental personnel, it can methodically exercise a wide range of 
inputs and configurations to discover vulnerabilities not adequately mitigated by the 




to larger portions of the system, eventually including scenarios that capture the unique 
needs of information, physical, operational, and personnel security as well as interactions 
among them. 
Developers must also conduct operational testing to measure the demand placed 
upon users by the security functions and requirements for computer and network, 
information, physical, operational, and personnel security.  This testing uses real 
operators and operationally representative environments to simulate the function of the 
system in a combat situation.  Part of this testing should measure the time, effort, and 
skill needed to operate securely, comparing those metrics with the system configured to 
operate without the security features and calculating the difference.  Testing, including 
comments from operators, will reveal those specific functions or procedures that impose 
a significant operational penalty.  Developers can then evaluate the relative cost and 
benefit of each security function and procedure and either improve or remove the ones 
that impose a cost far greater than their value to security.  Operational testing should also 
include a red team effort to compromise the system in a less predictable and controlled 
environment, providing one more opportunity to discover novel and unexpected 
vulnerabilities and attack techniques. 
There is an important distinction between functional testing and security testing 
(as introduced in Chapter II), though both are required to provide a reasonable assurance 
that the system will function properly and securely.  Functional testing steps through all 
the usage scenarios, simulating the users, interfacing systems, and inputs for each 
scenario.  It verifies that the system will correctly process inputs from users and other 
systems and react as intended without crashing or providing erroneous data.  It also 
ensures that the user interface is adequate to allow users to operate the system without 
confusion, delay, or error.  The Joint Interoperability Test Command, part of the Defense 
Information Systems Agency, plays a major role in functional testing of networked 
systems. 
In contrast, the security testing considers the ways that an attacker might attempt 
to compromise the system.  It considers the wide variety of unusual or unexpected inputs 
that might place the system in an insecure state.  Since there exists a nearly infinite 
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combination of unexpected inputs, configurations, and conditions, security testing cannot 
guarantee secure operation the way that functional testing can guarantee proper operation.  
This is why security testing must consider the most efficient attack methods, whether 
from the fields of computer, network, information, physical, operational, or personnel 
security, and apply testing effort toward vulnerabilities judged most likely to be exploited 
in an attack. 
B. CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION 
While testing provides a degree of technical assurance that the system will 
function as designed and will be both effective and suitable for combat use, the 
certification and accreditation process provides a parallel effort to judge the security of 
the system and ensure that systems are only operated if their security risk is reduced to an 
acceptable level.  The DoD currently uses the Defense Information Assurance 
Certification and Accreditation Program (DIACAP), as defined in DoD Instruction 
8510.01, to perform this function and to establish configuration management processes 
for security functions.  In this context, certification refers to technical evaluation of an 
information system that determines how well the system complies with its required 
Information Assurance (IA) controls.  Accreditation refers to the granting of permission 
to operate and acceptance of risk by a designated accrediting authority (DAA). 
The DIACAP applies to DoD information systems and is most applicable to 
office-automation systems using standard commercial hardware, software, and protocols.  
According to DoD Directive 8500.02E, DIACAP applicability extends to platform IT 
interconnections.  Platform IT refers to the hardware and software in special-purpose 
systems such as weapons, simulators, test and maintenance equipment, and research and 
development equipment.  The DIACAP does not apply to the platform IT itself, but only 
to its network connection.  This boundary in the DIACAP between the weapon system 
and its network connection works well for legacy weapon systems where the network 
connections are limited in scope; however, network-centric weapon systems will feature a 
highly-integrated network connection and will be designed with network functionality as 
a top priority.  The security features of a network-centric weapon system will span every 
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aspect of its operation, not just the network interface.  Therefore, the DIACAP will 
require either significant additional guidance or a revision before it can be applied to 
network-centric systems. 
DIACAP applicability, along with that of the entire DoD IA program described in 
DODD 8500.02E, does not extend to intelligence systems.  The intelligence community 
has its own certification and accreditation program, described in ICD 503.  Significant 
elements of a network-centric system, including unmanned sensors, satellites, and 
reconnaissance platforms, as well as the analysts and commanders who use the 
information provided by these elements, may fall under ICD 503 for their certification 
and accreditation.  The fact that two separate programs will be responsible for different 
parts of the overall system strains the cohesion of the system and threatens to prolong the 
legacy philosophy of independent systems.  If intelligence-gathering platforms are to be 
included in the network-centric system of the future, this split responsibility could greatly 
complicate the system’s development. 
The DIACAP assigns IA controls to information systems according to the level of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability needed by the particular system.  These controls 
include elements of computer and network security, information security, physical 
security, and personnel security.  Operational security concerns are handled separately in 
publications about tactical doctrine and do not contribute any IA controls.  DoD 
Instruction 8500.2, “Information Assurance Implementation,” lists controls grouped into 
the following subject areas: continuity, enclave boundary defense, enclave computing 
environment, identification and authentication, personnel, physical and environmental, 
security design and configuration, and vulnerability and incident management. 
Early in their development, information systems receive two designations that 
determine which IA controls will apply.  The Confidentiality Level (CL) of classified, 
sensitive, or public describes the sensitivity level of the information processed by the 
system and the degree of protection that must be applied to prevent attackers from 
learning this information.  The Mission Assurance Category (MAC) combines the 
integrity and availability needs of the system and describes the degree of protection 
needed to ensure that the system’s information is correct and accessible.  Systems 
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handling vital information for operational forces receive MAC I, systems handling 
important information for supporting missions receive MAC II, and systems handling 
day-to-day business information receive MAC III.  Each CL and each MAC has a 
separate attachment to enclosure 4 of DODI 8500.2 containing the required security 
controls, so all systems will use two of the six attachments to get the complete list of 
required controls. 
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This thesis has explored the security of network-centric weapon systems by 
describing the different sources of security risks and by explaining the importance of a 
systems engineering approach.  Developers and policy makers must keep security 
concerns in mind as they bring new network-centric systems to the warfighters.  Part of 
this consideration includes weighing the applicability of network-centric systems to 
current and future operations and building the communications tools to provide the 
foundation for the future network. 
A. APPLICABILITY TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS 
A military force using network-centric weapon systems would see the greatest 
advantage against another large, conventional military force.  The benefits of a networked 
force allow for improvements in maneuver and concentration of fire against ground units, 
ships, and aircraft.  It provides the ultimate expression of conventional, state-on-state, 
third-generation warfare. 
The military conflicts currently facing the United States and its allies do not 
conform to the type of combat that benefits from network-centric weapon systems.  
Rather, the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan resemble the counterinsurgency and fourth-
generation models of asymmetric warfare and political stabilization (Lind et al. 1989).  
These conflicts feature non-state actors, widely dispersed forces, and a blurred line 
between combatants and non-combatants.  The social, cultural, political, and economic 
factors that dominate these situations derive little benefit from an increasingly effective 
conventional military force—a force that lacks a proper enemy to engage. 
If the United States will primarily experience this unconventional type of warfare 
for the near future, an aggressive investment in network-centric weapon systems may be 
misplaced.  On the other hand, a robust network could serve as a force multiplier and 
allow a smaller conventional force to provide continuing deterrence against a large, 
conventional attack while the remainder of the force concentrates on unconventional 
missions.  The natural life-cycle progression of weapon systems provides opportunities to 
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add network-centric characteristics and capabilities in an incremental manner, providing 
opportunities for user feedback and for learning from early experimentation. 
The nascent network-centric capabilities used during Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have provided an opportunity for experimentation 
in an operational environment as well as a glimpse of their potential.  Commanders 
praised the ability to track friendly forces and the greater efficiency of air operations due 
to the situational awareness provided by data links (Office of Force Transformation 2005, 
17).  In these situations, however, the enemy lacked the ability to threaten the security of 
the network.  Security, therefore, has not been tested.  Conflict with a major power 
capable of sophisticated information warfare would probably include a major attack on 
all aspects of system security.  Developers, therefore, must not conclude that the lack of 
security problems to date indicates the lack of threats or vulnerabilities that may manifest 
themselves in the future. 
The move away from large-scale, conventional warfare has already manifested 
itself in recent changes to the FCS.  First, the Army canceled the manned ground vehicle 
portion of FCS.  Then, in May 2009, it changed the program to a successor program 
called Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization.  This new effort will continue many 
of the concepts from FCS, but will deliver them over a longer time period as a gradual 
force modernization.  As Ben Friedman, a research fellow at the CATO Institute 
commented, 
It will be better for the ground forces to have FCS broken up.  
Conventional insurgencies turn out to be situations where you want heavy 
vehicles.  We don’t need to get there that fast; you can get to theater on 
sealift.  It is probably good that the Pentagon is adjusting to realities that 
turn out to be different. (Osborne 2009)  
Despite these recent cuts, however, the Army still plans to create the tactical network 
envisioned for FCS and use it with the upgraded forces as they are deployed (Osborne 
2009).  The pace may have slowed, but the march toward a network-centric force 
continues as the services plan to gradually add more networking capabilities and 
network-centric tactics. 
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The future development and deployment of network-centric weapon systems 
depends largely on the enabling communications technology that gives disparate units the 
ability to share information.  One example of this enabling technology is the Joint 
Tactical Radio System (JTRS).  JTRS promises to provide this capability, featuring nine 
separate waveforms optimized for different users with their unique needs and constraints.  
JTRS radios feature a modular and open-architecture design with most functionality 
provided by software.  This design allows services to buy compatible radios and use 
software configuration to optimize the functions to the particular mission needs (Carmana 
2009). 
B. SUMMARY OF SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NETWORK-
CENTRIC WEAPON SYSTEMS 
Network-centric weapon systems offer the prospect of greater efficiency and 
effectiveness of a military force.  The combination of situational awareness, self-
synchronization, and robustness of command promises to help a smaller force operate 
with the power of a much larger force without the investment and risk of adding more 
vehicles and personnel.  As shown in this thesis, network-centric weapon systems also 
introduce the critical, strategic-level risk that the network could fall victim to an 
asymmetric attack.  Given the expertise and opportunity, a much smaller opposing force 
might discover critical information, plant false data into friendly networks, and shut down 
the network entirely. 
Industry experience with large-scale computer networks shows their lack of 
security and the consequences of security-related attacks.  Given the schedule and budget 
pressures upon the defense industry, network-centric systems will likely use commercial 
hardware, software, and protocols for some of their construction (Camana 2009, 2-PM-
28).  Therefore, many of the security practices seen on commercial office-automation and 
electronic commerce systems carry through to these future weapon systems and their 
supporting networks.  Unfortunately, much of the scholarship on hacking and computer 
security focuses on technical attacks on hardware and software and ignores the multi-
faceted systems engineering approach necessary to protect a weapon system. 
 74
The overall system-level security of a network-centric weapon system can be 
described as a combination of network and computer security, information security, 
physical security, operational security, and personnel security.  Each aspect brings unique 
dangers and protection methods that must be considered in the larger context of the 
military operation.  A military adversary will seek the most efficient means to weaken the 
advantage provided by the network, so developers must seek the systems perspective and 
guard against the most efficient attacks.  No computer system, and certainly not one as 
complex as a tactical military network, can be completely safe against all attacks on 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but the efficient and comprehensive protection 
of the network and all its components may stave off a compromise long enough for 
friendly forces to achieve their objectives. 
The systems engineering approach to security applies throughout the system life 
cycle to program managers, developers, commanders, operators, and maintainers.  At 
each stage, all these stakeholders should recall the importance of security and the 
consequences of attacks on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  They must 
maintain the systems engineering approach and consider the possible consequences to the 
larger system rather than focusing exclusively on their own area of specialization. 
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